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A noncooperative marriage model with remarriage

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  • Michael Malcolm

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  • Michael Malcolm, 2012. "A noncooperative marriage model with remarriage," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 133-151, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:reveho:v:10:y:2012:i:1:p:133-151
    DOI: 10.1007/s11150-010-9110-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joaquín Andaluz & José Molina, 2007. "On the sustainability of bargaining solutions in family decision models," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 405-418, December.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1, June.
    3. Hauk, Esther, 2001. "Leaving the Prison: Permitting Partner Choice and Refusal in Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 18(1), pages 65-87, August.
    4. Betsey Stevenson, 2007. "The Impact of Divorce Laws on Marriage-Specific Capital," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 75-94.
    5. Carmichael, H Lorne & MacLeod, W Bentley, 1997. "Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(3), pages 485-509, August.
    6. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-137, May.
    7. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2007. "Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 27-52, Spring.
    8. Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 1996. "Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(3), pages 491-519.
    9. J. J. McCall, 1970. "Economics of Information and Job Search," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(1), pages 113-126.
    10. François Bourguignon & Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 1993. "Intra Household Allocation of Consumption: A Model and some Evidence from French Data," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 29, pages 137-156.
    11. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    12. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    13. Tauchen, Helen V & Witte, Ann Dryden & Long, Sharon K, 1991. "Domestic Violence: A Nonrandom Affair," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(2), pages 491-511, May.
    14. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 2007. "The American Family and Family Economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 3-26, Spring.
    15. Hoddinott, John & Adam, Christopher, 1998. "Testing Nash-bargaining household models with time-series data," FCND discussion papers 52, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    16. repec:adr:anecst:y:1993:i:29:p:07 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Yoram Weiss, 2006. "Divorce, Remarriage, and Welfare: A General Equilibrium Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(2-3), pages 415-426, 04-05.
    18. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
    19. Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak, 2003. "Efficiency in Marriage," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 153-167, September.
    20. repec:bla:scandj:v:97:y:1995:i:4:p:581-601 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Murat Nick & P. Randall Walsh, 2007. "Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(2), pages 507-535.
    22. Lucia A. Nixon, 1997. "The Effect of Child Support Enforcement on Marital Dissolution," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(1), pages 159-181.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Divorce; Remarriage; Repeated prisoner’s dilemma; Game theory; Household economics; D13; C73; J12;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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