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Sabotaging cost containment

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  • Debashis Pal
  • David Sappington
  • Ying Tang

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Debashis Pal & David Sappington & Ying Tang, 2012. "Sabotaging cost containment," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 293-314, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:41:y:2012:i:3:p:293-314
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-012-9187-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mandy, David M, 2000. "Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 157-172, March.
    2. Gupta, Barnali & Heywood, John S. & Pal, Debashis, 1995. "Strategic behavior downstream and the incentive to integrate: A spatial model with delivered pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 327-334, September.
    3. Mattos, César, 2009. "Open access policies, regulated charges and non-price discrimination in telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 253-260, November.
    4. Sand, Jan Y., 2004. "Regulation with non-price discrimination," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1289-1307, November.
    5. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
    6. Bustos Alvaro E & Galetovic Alexander, 2009. "Vertical Integration and Sabotage with a Regulated Bottleneck Monopoly," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-52, September.
    7. Arup Bose & Debashis Pal & David E.M. Sappington, 2011. "Pareto-improving inefficiency," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 94-110, January.
    8. Reiffen David & Ward Michael R, 2002. "Recent Empirical Evidence on Discrimination by Regulated Firms," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-15, March.
    9. repec:bla:jindec:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:319-33 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Anant, T. C. A. & Basu, Kaushik & Mukherji, Badal, 1995. "A model of monopoly with strategic government intervention," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 25-43, May.
    11. T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, 2001. "Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 319-333, September.
    12. Weisman, Dennis L & Kang, Jaesung, 2001. "Incentives for Discrimination when Upstream Monopolists Participate in Downstream Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 125-139, September.
    13. David Mandy & David Sappington, 2007. "Incentives for sabotage in vertically related industries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 235-260, June.
    14. Fletcher Deborah & Slutsky Steven, 2010. "Bad Government Can Be Good Politics: Political Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Strategic Shirking," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-58, May.
    15. Judith R. Gelman & Steven C. Salop, 1983. "Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 315-325, Autumn.
    16. Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer & John Sumpter, 2005. "Bringing Competition to Telecommunications by Divesting the RBOCs," Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, in: Michel A. Crew & Michael A. Crew & Menahem Spiegel (ed.), Obtaining the Best from Regulation and Competition, chapter 0, pages 21-40, Springer.
    17. Wood, LisaV. & Sappington, DavidE.M., 2004. "On the design of performance measurement plans in the telecommunications industry," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 801-820, December.
    18. Economides, Nicholas, 1998. "The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 271-284, May.
    19. David Sappington, 2006. "On the Merits of Vertical Divestiture," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 29(3), pages 171-191, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David P. Brown & David E. M. Sappington, 2021. "On the profitability of self‐sabotage," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 68-91, February.
    2. Flores, Daniel, 2016. "Violence and law enforcement in markets for illegal goods," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 77-87.
    3. Brown, David P. & Sappington, David E. M., 2017. "Self-Sabotage in the Procurement of Distributed Energy Resources," Working Papers 2017-11, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Sabotage; Cost containment; Vertical integration; D21; L22; L50;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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