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Voluntary relationships among mobile network operators and mobile virtual network operators: An economic explanation

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  • Banerjee, Aniruddha
  • Dippon, Christian M.

Abstract

Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) do not hold spectrum licenses and own little or no network infrastructure. Rather, they resell mobile services by purchasing airtime at wholesale rates from mobile network operators (MNOs). Unlike ordinary resellers, MVNOs rely on brand appeal and reputation acquired in other businesses to sell mobile services (often bundled with other products). Significant worldwide growth in voluntary MNO-MVNO partnerships, without intervention from public policies that mandate MVNO access to MNO networks, raises many interesting issues. Since MNOs that sell wholesale services to MVNOs potentially forfeit sales in downstream retail markets, voluntary relationships are plausible only if MVNOs add value by widening and/or deepening MNO-served markets. This paper provides sufficient conditions for profit-maximizing MNOs and MVNOs to form voluntary strategic partnerships based on resale, product differentiation, and rebranding. The two key factors are (1) value of the MVNO's brand reputation and (2) wholesale discount at which the MNO offers service to the MVNO.

Suggested Citation

  • Banerjee, Aniruddha & Dippon, Christian M., 2009. "Voluntary relationships among mobile network operators and mobile virtual network operators: An economic explanation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 72-84, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:72-84
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    Cited by:

    1. Key Pousttchi & Yvonne Hufenbach, 2011. "Value Creation in the Mobile Market," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 3(5), pages 299-311, October.
    2. Jeong-Yoo Kim & Sawoong Kang, 2014. "Entry Invoking," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 30, pages 247-271.
    3. Brito, Duarte & Pereira, Pedro & Vareda, João, 2012. "Incentives to invest and to give access to non-regulated new technologies," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 197-211.
    4. Bauer, Johannes M., 2014. "Platforms, systems competition, and innovation: Reassessing the foundations of communications policy," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 662-673.
    5. Garrido, Elisabet & Whalley, Jason, 2013. "Competition in wholesale markets: Do MNOs compete to host MVNOs?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 1124-1141.
    6. Luis Guijarro & Vicent Pla & Bruno Tuffin & Patrick Maillé & Jose Vidal, 2011. "Competition and bargaining in wireless networks with spectrum leasing," Post-Print hal-00725488, HAL.
    7. Barua, Bidushi & Matinmikko-Blue, Marja & Latva-aho, Matti, 2019. "On Design of Contracts Between Traditional MNOs and Local 5G Micro Operators," 30th European Regional ITS Conference, Helsinki 2019 205166, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    8. Cricelli, Livio & Grimaldi, Michele & Levialdi Ghiron, Nathan, 2012. "The impact of regulating mobile termination rates and MNO–MVNO relationships on retail prices," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-12.

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