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Recent Empirical Evidence on Discrimination by Regulated Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Reiffen David

    (U.S. Department of the Treasury)

  • Ward Michael R

    (University of Illinois)

Abstract

Well-established economic principles show that regulated monopolies may have an incentive to act discriminatorily against rivals of their unregulated affiliates. This paper discusses some recent empirical evidence regarding discrimination in telecommunications. Specifically, it surveys anecdotal and systematic evidence that LECs discriminate against unaffiliated providers of mobile telephony. Evidence regarding discrimination by LECs against rival local phone companies is also discussed. At the same time, the evidence suggests that allowing LECs to enter cellular telephony may result in higher-quality or lower-cost cellular phone provision. These findings provide evidence that discrimination is a real phenomenon, and that there is a policy trade-off between preventing discrimination (by mandating separation) and realizing economies of scope.

Suggested Citation

  • Reiffen David & Ward Michael R, 2002. "Recent Empirical Evidence on Discrimination by Regulated Firms," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-15, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:1:y:2002:i:1:n:2
    DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Manuel Ammann & Rachel Berchtold & Ralf Seiz, 2011. "Demographic Change and Pharmaceuticals' Stock Returns," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 17(4), pages 726-754, September.
    2. Kondaurova, Irina & Weisman, Dennis L., 2003. "Incentives for non-price discrimination," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 147-171, June.
    3. Sand, Jan Y., 2004. "Regulation with non-price discrimination," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1289-1307, November.
    4. Bose, Arup & Pal, Debashis & Sappington, David E.M., 2017. "Pricing to preclude sabotage in regulated industries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 162-184.
    5. Mattos, César, 2009. "Open access policies, regulated charges and non-price discrimination in telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 253-260, November.
    6. Bustos Alvaro E & Galetovic Alexander, 2009. "Vertical Integration and Sabotage with a Regulated Bottleneck Monopoly," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-52, September.
    7. Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King & Julian Wright, 2005. "Wireless Communications," Monash Economics Working Papers archive-45, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    8. Debashis Pal & David Sappington & Ying Tang, 2012. "Sabotaging cost containment," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 293-314, June.

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