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Bad Government Can Be Good Politics: Political Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Strategic Shirking

Author

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  • Fletcher Deborah

    (Miami University, fletchd@muohio.edu)

  • Slutsky Steven

    (University of Florida, steven.slutsky@cba.ufl.edu)

Abstract

We develop a model of a contest between two political candidates who may care about their reputations separately from how they affect the election outcome. In the game's first stage, each candidate chooses to maintain his maximum reputation or to shirk to lower it. In the second stage, candidates undertake positive or negative campaigns. We allow the magnitudes of reputational effects of positive and negative campaigns, and the relative importance candidates place on reputation and winning, to vary. Under many parameter values, candidates shirk in order to either decrease negative campaigning in the second stage or to increase their probability of winning the election. This result persists even when some of the main assumptions of the model are relaxed.

Suggested Citation

  • Fletcher Deborah & Slutsky Steven, 2010. "Bad Government Can Be Good Politics: Political Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Strategic Shirking," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-58, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:22
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1580
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aranson, Peter H. & Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1974. "Election Goals and Strategies: Equivalent and Nonequivalent Candidate Objectives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 135-152, March.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Arup Bose & Debashis Pal & David E. M. Sappington, 2016. "All entrepreneurial productivity increases are not created equal," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(3), pages 952-974, January.

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    Keywords

    negative campaigning; shirking;

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