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Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly

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  • Shuichi Ohori

Abstract

This paper explores the optimal environmental tax and level of privatization in an international duopolistic market. We show that when the government is able to control the environmental tax and the extent of privatization, the optimal environmental tax is lower than the standard Pigouvian level. We also show that the optimal level of privatization of state-owned enterprises is partial privatization. Further, the optimal level of privatization is inversely dependent on the cleanup cost of past environmental contamination. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Shuichi Ohori, 2006. "Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 225-233, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:29:y:2006:i:2:p:225-233
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-6037-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental policy; International trade; Privatization; F12; L33; Q58;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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