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Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats

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  • Jan Brueckner
  • Kevin O'Brien

Abstract

This paper tests for self-interested behavior by local-government bureaucrats engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions. A theoretical model is developed that shows the effect of Niskanen-style bureaucratic self-interest in the two standard bargaining models: the demand-constrained model and the efficient-bargain model. These predictions are then tested using national cross-section data on unionized police, fire, and sanitation workers. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Brueckner & Kevin O'Brien, 1989. "Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 15-41, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:63:y:1989:i:1:p:15-41
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00223270
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    Cited by:

    1. Dahlberg, Matz & Lundqvist, Heléne & Mörk, Eva, 2008. "Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power," Working Paper Series 2008:17, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    2. Jan K. Brueckner, 2001. "Prior Restrictions on Bargaining Contract Curves," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(1), pages 1-7.
    3. Kevin M. O'Brien, 1992. "Form of Government and Collective Bargaining Outcomes," Public Finance Review, , vol. 20(1), pages 64-76, January.
    4. Lankford, Hamilton & Wyckoff, James, 1997. "The changing structure of teacher compensation, 1970-1994," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 371-384, October.

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