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Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902–1954

Author

Listed:
  • Sawyer, Jack
  • MacRae, Duncan

Abstract

Since the theory of games was first made widely available, with application to economic behavior, its use has been suggested in many other areas, from the global to the individual. Several correspondences between game theory and certain aspects of political process have been noted. The contribution of game theory to substantive knowledge in the empirical sciences, however, has been modest; Luce and Raiffa judge that its impact has been greater in applied mathematics. The area of political behavior—despite the apparent applicability of the notion of conflict of interest—is similarly lacking in studies, although a few notable exceptions exist.

Suggested Citation

  • Sawyer, Jack & MacRae, Duncan, 1962. "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902–1954," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 936-946, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:56:y:1962:i:04:p:936-946_07
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    Cited by:

    1. Casella, Alessandra & Guo, Jeffrey Da-Ren & Jiang, Michelle, 2023. "Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 133-155.
    2. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2023. "Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 27-44, January.
    3. Ginsburgh, Victor & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Weber, Shlomo, 2017. "Ranking languages in the European Union: Before and after Brexit," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 139-151.
    4. Fahrenberger, Theresa & Gersbach, Hans, 2010. "Minority voting and long-term decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 329-345, July.
    5. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    6. Algaba, Encarnación & Béal, Sylvain & Fragnelli, Vito & Llorca, Natividad & Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquin, 2019. "Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    7. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Weber, Shlomo, 2022. "The measurement of the value of a language," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    8. Casella, Alessandra, 2005. "Storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 391-419, May.
    9. Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "An experimental study of storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 123-154, October.
    10. Ginsburgh, Victor & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Weber, Shlomo, 2017. "Ranking languages in the European Union: Before and after Brexit," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 139-151.
    11. Gergaud, Olivier & Ginsburgh, Victor & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2021. "Wine Ratings: Seeking a Consensus among Tasters via Normalization, Approval, and Aggregation," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(3), pages 321-342, August.
    12. Olivier Gergaud & Victor Ginsburgh & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2020. "Wine Ratings," Working Papers ECARES 2020-38, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    13. Casella, Alessandra, 2001. "Market mechanisms for policy decisions: Tools for the European Union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 995-1006, May.
    14. Gersbach, Hans & Wickramage, Kamali, 2021. "Balanced voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 203-229.
    15. Duane Cooper & Arthur Zillante, 2012. "A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 363-383, January.
    16. Gary Cox, 1984. "Electoral equilibrium in double member districts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 443-451, January.

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