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Universalism in Experimental Committees

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  • Miller, Gary J.
  • Oppenheimer, Joe A.

Abstract

Most rational choice theories of committee decision making predict a process of competitive coalition formation leading to a minimum winning coalition. Committee experiments reported to date tend to support these theories. However, both theories and committee experiments are contradicted by the evidence of real-world legislatures making distributive decisions; these decisions are characterized by coalitions of the whole providing virtually all members with a share of distributive benefits. The results in this article help to resolve this contradiction by showing that if the committee experimental design includes a universalistic alternative which provides a high level of expected benefits for committee members, it will be selected. Competitive coalition formation occurs in experimental settings which do not include such an alternative. The results call into question the generality of ordinalist theories of competitive coalition formation.

Suggested Citation

  • Miller, Gary J. & Oppenheimer, Joe A., 1982. "Universalism in Experimental Committees," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 561-574, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:76:y:1982:i:03:p:561-574_18
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Buchanan, Joy A. & Roberts, Gavin, 2022. "Other people’s money: Preferences for equality in groups," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    2. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2003. "Transaction Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 193-207, April.
    3. Dougherty, Keith L. & Kisaalita, Alice & McKissick, Jordan & Katz, Evan, 2020. "Stopping rules for majority voting: A public choice experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 353-364.
    4. Keith Dougherty & Brian Pitts & Justin Moeller & Robi Ragan, 2014. "An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 359-382, March.
    5. Cheryl L. Eavey, 1991. "Patterns of Distribution in Spatial Games," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(4), pages 450-474, October.
    6. William P. Bottom & Cheryl L. Eavey & Gary J. Miller, 1996. "Getting to the Core," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(2), pages 298-319, June.
    7. Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer, 1984. "Post election redistributive strategies of representatives: A partial theory of the politics of redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 113-131, January.
    8. Hsu, Li-Chen & Yang, C.C. & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2008. "Positive- versus zero-sum majoritarian ultimatum games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 498-510, December.
    9. Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer & Pat Bond & Irvin Boschman, 1984. "Beyond Economic Man," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(1), pages 3-24, March.

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