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Bureaucratic Competition and Agenda Control

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  • Cheryl L. Eavey

    (Florida State University)

Abstract

Competition among bureaus is often advanced as a solution to overproduction by monopoly bureaus. Further, competition tends to be viewed as some kind of natural state which bureaus will willingly gravitate to if given the opportunity. Beginning with the theoretical extensions of Niskanen to multiple bureaus, this article examines experimentally the effect of a competitive agenda proposal process on the outcomes of three-person committee games. The results suggest that simply duplicating the functions of a bureau is insufficient to generate increased efficiency. The success or failure of competitive reforms depends on the structure these reforms take, both in terms of the number of agenda setters and the level of communication between agenda setters and committee members.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheryl L. Eavey, 1987. "Bureaucratic Competition and Agenda Control," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(3), pages 503-524, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:31:y:1987:i:3:p:503-524
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002787031003005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph March & Robert K. von Weizsäcker & Robert K. von Weizsäcker, 2016. "Coordinating Intergenerational Redistribution and the Repayment of Public Debt," CESifo Working Paper Series 6075, CESifo.

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