IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/theord/v61y2006i1p51-62.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Method for Eliciting Utilities and its Application to Collective Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Ilia Tsetlin

Abstract

Designing a mechanism that provides a direct incentive for an individual to report her utility function over several alternatives is a difficult task. A framework for such mechanism design is the following: an individual (a decision maker) is faced with an optimization problem (e.g., maximization of expected utility), and a mechanism designer observes the decision maker’s action. The mechanism does reveal the individual’s utility truthfully if the mechanism designer, having observed the decision maker’s action, infers the decision maker’s utilities over several alternatives. This paper studies an example of such a mechanism and discusses its application to the problem of optimal social choice. Under certain simplifying assumptions about individuals’ utility functions and about how voters choose their voting strategies, this mechanism selects the alternative that maximizes Harsanyi’s social utility function and is Pareto-efficient. Copyright Springer 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Ilia Tsetlin, 2006. "A Method for Eliciting Utilities and its Application to Collective Choice," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 51-62, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:1:p:51-62
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-006-7191-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-006-7191-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11238-006-7191-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James S. Dyer & Rakesh K. Sarin, 1982. "Relative Risk Aversion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(8), pages 875-886, August.
    2. David K. Musto & Bilge Yilmaz, 2003. "Trading and Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 990-1003, October.
    3. R. Winkler & Javier Muñoz & José Cervera & José Bernardo & Gail Blattenberger & Joseph Kadane & Dennis Lindley & Allan Murphy & Robert Oliver & David Ríos-Insua, 1996. "Scoring rules and the evaluation of probabilities," TEST: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 5(1), pages 1-60, June.
    4. James S. Dyer & Rakesh K. Sarin, 1979. "Group Preference Aggregation Rules Based on Strength of Preference," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(9), pages 822-832, September.
    5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
    6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    7. Samuel Merrill, 1981. "Strategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 115-134, January.
    8. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(4), pages 309-309.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Luis C. Dias & Paula Sarabando, 2012. "A Note on a Group Preference Axiomatization with Cardinal Utility," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 9(3), pages 231-237, September.
    2. Manel Baucells & Rakesh K. Sarin, 2003. "Group Decisions with Multiple Criteria," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(8), pages 1105-1118, August.
    3. Marcus Pivato, 2015. "Social choice with approximate interpersonal comparison of welfare gains," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(2), pages 181-216, September.
    4. Kim, Semin, 2017. "Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 350-371.
    5. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2022. "Epistemological implementation of social choice functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 389-402.
    6. Ralph L. Keeney, 2013. "Foundations for Group Decision Analysis," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 10(2), pages 103-120, June.
    7. Bendoly, Elliot & Bachrach, Daniel G., 2003. "A process-based model for priority convergence in multi-period group decision-making," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 534-545, August.
    8. Mongin, Philippe, 2019. "Interview of Peter J. Hammond," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 50, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    9. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Han Bleichrodt & Olivier l'Haridon & Corina Paraschiv, 2013. "Is There One Unifying Concept of Utility?An Experimental Comparison of Utility Under Risk and Utility Over Time," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(9), pages 2153-2169, September.
    10. Hayashida, Tomohiro & Nishizaki, Ichiro & Ueda, Yoshifumi, 2010. "Multiattribute utility analysis for policy selection and financing for the preservation of the forest," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 200(3), pages 833-843, February.
    11. Aki Lehtinen, 2011. "A welfarist critique of social choice theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(3), pages 359-381, July.
    12. Kotaro Suzumura, 2002. "Introduction to social choice and welfare," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 442, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    13. Kolmar, Martin, 1999. "Optimale Ansiedlung sozialpolitischer Entscheidungskompetenzen in der Europäischen Union," Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, edition 1, volume 7, number urn:isbn:9783161471254, May.
    14. Baucells, Manel & Shapley, Lloyd S., 2008. "Multiperson utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 329-347, March.
    15. Ali E. Abbas, 2006. "Maximum Entropy Utility," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 54(2), pages 277-290, April.
    16. Semin Kim, 2016. "Ordinal Versus Cardinal Voting Rules: A Mechanism Design Approach," Working papers 2016rwp-94, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    17. Abellan-Perpiñan, Jose Maria & Bleichrodt, Han & Pinto-Prades, Jose Luis, 2009. "The predictive validity of prospect theory versus expected utility in health utility measurement," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1039-1047, December.
    18. James E. Smith & Detlof von Winterfeldt, 2004. "Anniversary Article: Decision Analysis in Management Science," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(5), pages 561-574, May.
    19. Charles M. Harvey & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2010. "Cardinal Scales for Health Evaluation," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(3), pages 256-281, September.
    20. Kaynar, Nur & Karsu, Özlem, 2018. "Equitable decision making approaches over allocations of multiple benefits to multiple entities," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 85-98.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:1:p:51-62. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.