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The effects of abstentions on election outcomes

Author

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  • William Gehrlein
  • Peter Fishburn

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1978. "The effects of abstentions on election outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 69-82, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:33:y:1978:i:2:p:69-82
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00118358
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hinich, Melvin J. & Ledyard, John O. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1972. "Nonvoting and the existence of equilibrium under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 144-153, April.
    2. Amartya Kumar Sen, 1964. "Preferences, Votes and the Transitivity of Majority Decisions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 31(2), pages 163-165.
    3. DeMeyer, Frank & Plott, Charles R, 1970. "The Probability of a Cyclical Majority," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(2), pages 345-354, March.
    4. Davis, Otto A. & Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1970. "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 426-448, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2021. "Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 55-73, Springer.
    2. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention," Working Papers hal-02196387, HAL.

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