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An expected-utility model of electoral competition

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  • Gary Cox

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  • Gary Cox, 1984. "An expected-utility model of electoral competition," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 337-349, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:18:y:1984:i:4:p:337-349
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00227590
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wittman, Donald A., 1973. "Parties as Utility Maximizers," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 490-498, June.
    2. François Petry, 1982. "Vote-maximizing versus utility-maximizing candidates: Comparing dynamic models of Bi-Party competition," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 16(6), pages 507-526, December.
    3. Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1970. "Plurality Maximization vs Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 772-791, September.
    4. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February.
    5. Davis, Otto A. & Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1970. "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 426-448, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Norman Schofield & Robert P. Parks, 1993. "EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN A SPATIAL MODEL OF n-PARTY COMPETITION," Public Economics 9308002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Dec 1994.
    2. Schofield, Norman & Parks, Robert, 2000. "Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 133-174, March.

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