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How to choose a compatible committee?

Author

Listed:
  • Ritu Dutta

    (Dibrugarh University)

  • Rajnish Kumar

    (Queen’s University Belfast)

  • Surajit Borkotokey

    (Dibrugarh University)

Abstract

Electing a committee of size k from m candidates ( $$k

Suggested Citation

  • Ritu Dutta & Rajnish Kumar & Surajit Borkotokey, 2024. "How to choose a compatible committee?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 201(1), pages 181-198, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:201:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-024-01163-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01163-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Piotr Faliszewski & Piotr Skowron & Arkadii Slinko & Nimrod Talmon, 2018. "Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 513-550, October.
    2. Pierre Dehez & Victor Ginsburgh, 2020. "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 415-428, September.
    3. Casajus, André, 2014. "The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 1-4.
    4. Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
    5. Giulia Bernardi & Roberto Lucchetti & Stefano Moretti, 2019. "Ranking objects from a preference relation over their subsets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(4), pages 589-606, April.
    6. Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Weiss, 2011. "Making statements and approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 461-472, October.
    7. Ritu Dutta & Souvik Roy & Surajit Borkotokey, 2023. "The Generalized Shapley Value of Cooperative Games as a Social Preference Function," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 277-300, April.
    8. Lackner, Martin & Skowron, Piotr, 2021. "Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    9. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
    10. Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori, 2011. "Characterization of the Shapley–Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 615-621.
    11. Thomas Ratliff & Donald Saari, 2014. "Complexities of electing diverse committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 55-71, June.
    12. Darmann, Andreas, 2013. "How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 282-292.
    13. Edith Elkind & Piotr Faliszewski & Piotr Skowron & Arkadii Slinko, 2017. "Properties of multiwinner voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 599-632, March.
    14. Thomas C. Ratliff, 2003. "Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 433-454, December.
    15. Roberto Lucchetti & Stefano Moretti & Fioravante Patrone, 2015. "Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 23(2), pages 567-590, July.
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