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q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules

Author

Listed:
  • Clinton Gubong Gassi

    (Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France)

  • Eric Kamwa

    (Université de Lorraine, BETA, F-54000 Nancy, France)

Abstract

This paper introduces the q-fixed majority property for committee selection rules, which extends the traditional fixed majority principle to a flexible framework. We examine conditions under which the committee scoring rules satisfy the q-fixed majority property. Focusing on (weakly) separable rules, we find that the Bloc rule is the only which satisfies it for all q > 1/2. In addition, the q-bottom majority property is introduced, highlighting conditions under which committees can be excluded based on voter consensus.

Suggested Citation

  • Clinton Gubong Gassi & Eric Kamwa, 2024. "q-fixed majority efficiency of committee scoring rules," Working Papers 2024-17, CRESE.
    • Handle: RePEc:crb:wpaper:2024-17
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Piotr Faliszewski & Piotr Skowron & Arkadii Slinko & Nimrod Talmon, 2018. "Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 513-550, October.
    2. Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2022. "Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 319-347, March.
    3. Kamwa, Eric, 2017. "On stable rules for selecting committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 36-44.
    4. Daniela Bubboloni & Mostapha Diss & Michele Gori, 2020. "Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 151-185, April.
    5. Debord, Bernard, 1993. "Prudent k-choice functions: properties and algorithms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 63-77, July.
    6. Skowron, Piotr & Faliszewski, Piotr & Slinko, Arkadii, 2019. "Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 244-273.
    7. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2008. "How to choose a non-controversial list with k names," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 79-96, June.
    8. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003. "The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 685-688, October.
    9. Edith Elkind & Piotr Faliszewski & Piotr Skowron & Arkadii Slinko, 2017. "Properties of multiwinner voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 599-632, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting; multiwinner elections; committee scoring rules; q-fixed majority.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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