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You can’t always get what you want: why revolutionary outcomes so often diverge from revolutionary goals

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  • Jack A. Goldstone

    (George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government)

Abstract

Revolutions rarely achieve their expressed goals, which often include greater economic prosperity, a more egalitarian distribution of rewards, ending corruption, and a less oppressive state. Yet there is no single reason for this, as revolutions of many types—violent and non-violent, radical and moderate—can produce similar outcomes. We explain this by treating revolutionary outcomes as the result of a decision tree process, in which outcomes are reached by a series of steps in which only the initial state of each step and the events at that junction determine the subsequent step. This simplification allows us to identify numerous pathways by which revolutions can unfold. However, relatively few such trajectories lead to stable constitutional regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Jack A. Goldstone, 2024. "You can’t always get what you want: why revolutionary outcomes so often diverge from revolutionary goals," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 457-472, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:200:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01092-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01092-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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