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Francesco Forte: an economist across boundaries

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  • Silvia Fedeli

    (Sapienza – University of Rome)

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  • Silvia Fedeli, 2022. "Francesco Forte: an economist across boundaries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 273-280, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:190:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-022-00965-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-00965-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francesco Forte, 2012. "From The Calculus of Consent to public choice and to public economics in a public choice approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 285-288, September.
    2. Thomas D. Willett & Francesco Forte, 1969. "Interest Rate Policy and External Balance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 83(2), pages 242-262.
    3. Forte, Francesco, 1994. "A Cooperative Game Approach to Optimal Saving Theory: Toward a Constitution for Savings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 339-362, December.
    4. Beqiraj, Elton & Fedeli, Silvia & Forte, Francesco, 2018. "Public debt sustainability: An empirical study on OECD countries," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 238-248.
    5. Fedeli, Silvia & Forte, Francesco, 2003. "Public Co-financing of Private Sector's Investments: Subsidiarity and Corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(1-2), pages 109-145, July.
    6. Forte, Francesco, 1982. "The Law of Selection in the Public Economy as Compared to the Market Economy," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 37(2), pages 224-245.
    7. Francesco Forte, 1999. "The Italian Post War Fiscal Constitution: Reasons of a Failure," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 103-117, March.
    8. Francesco Forte, 2010. "Principles of Public Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1341.
    9. Francesco Forte, 2018. "Introduction to welfare economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(3), pages 301-317, December.
    10. Francesco Forte & James M. Buchanan, 1961. "The Evaluation of Public Services," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(2), pages 107-107.
    11. Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2007. "Measures of the Amending Power of Government and Parliament. The Case of Italy 1988–2002," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 309-338, September.
    12. Elton Beqiraj & Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2018. "Public budgetary rules and GDP growth: An empirical study on OECD and twelve european countries," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(1), pages 170-188, July.
    13. Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2001. "Voting Powers and the Efficiency of the Decision-Making Process in the European Council of Ministers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 5-38, July.
    14. Francesco Forte, 1997. "La costituzione fiscale di Maastricht e le regole di bilancio italiane sulle entrate pubbliche," Rivista italiana degli economisti, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 273-294.
    15. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    16. Fedeli, Silvia & Forte, Francesco & Leonida, Leone, 2014. "The law of survival of the political class: An analysis of the Italian parliament (1946–2013)," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 102-121.
    17. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
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