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The law of survival of the political class: An analysis of the Italian parliament (1946–2013)

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  • Fedeli, Silvia
  • Forte, Francesco
  • Leonida, Leone

Abstract

We study the role of age, re-election, gender, education, profession, party affiliation, area of election and different electoral systems on the political survival of 7127 members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Senate, observed from 1946 to 2013. Our results suggest that theories assuming a competitive political market for the selection of the candidates have a limited validity for survival in the Italian context, whereas the model assimilating the political class to an elite connected with interest groups that rules even through partially irrational motivation and fiscal illusion is more appropriate in providing a general explanation.

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  • Fedeli, Silvia & Forte, Francesco & Leonida, Leone, 2014. "The law of survival of the political class: An analysis of the Italian parliament (1946–2013)," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 102-121.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:35:y:2014:i:c:p:102-121
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.05.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Quaresima, Federico, 2019. "Patronage Appointments between Politics and Public Governance: a Review," MPRA Paper 94650, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Scharfenkamp, Katrin, 2018. "The effects of bridging business and politics – A survival analysis of German Federal ministers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 433-454.
    3. Silvia Fedeli, 2022. "Francesco Forte: an economist across boundaries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 273-280, March.
    4. Federico Quaresima & Fabio Fiorillo, 2017. "The patronage effect: a theoretical perspective of patronage and political selection," Working papers 63, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    5. Emanuele Brancati & Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte & Leone Leonida, 2022. "Opportunism and MPs’ chances of re-election: an analysis of political transformism in the Italian parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(3), pages 273-308, September.
    6. Giampaolo Garzarelli & Lyndal Keeton, 2016. "Policy Experimentation and Intergovernmental Grants in a Federal System," Working Papers 8/16, Sapienza University of Rome, DISS.
    7. Paulo Reis Mourao & Alina Irina Popescu, 2021. "Discussing the political survival of Romanian ministers since 1989—Do economic conditions matter?," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(1), pages 63-93, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political enterprise; Political class; Survival analysis; Italian Parliament;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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