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Bootleggers, Baptists and ballots: coalitions in Arkansas’ alcohol-legalization elections

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  • Jeremy Horpedahl

    (University of Central Arkansas)

Abstract

Yandle (Regulation 7(3):12–16, 1983) proposed a “bootleggers and Baptists” framework to explain political coalition formation. Using mandatory disclosure reports, I document actual examples of such coalitions in Arkansas county-level elections to legalize alcohol. The coalitions often are composed of liquor stores in bordering counties where alcohol already is legal, along with churches and other religious organizations. Funding comes primarily from existing liquor stores, although religious organizations provide funding in some cases. Religious organizations contribute to the coalition in several non-monetary forms, which I also document in this article by reference to news reports and other sources. The results confirm Yandle’s theory of tacit coalitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy Horpedahl, 2021. "Bootleggers, Baptists and ballots: coalitions in Arkansas’ alcohol-legalization elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 203-219, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:188:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00822-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00822-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Munger, Michael & Schaller, Thomas, 1997. "The Prohibition-Repeal Amendments: A Natural Experiment in Interest Group Influence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 139-163, March.
    2. Adam Smith & Richard Wagner & Bruce Yandle, 2011. "A theory of entangled political economy, with application to TARP and NRA," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 45-66, July.
    3. J. R. Clark & Dwight R. Lee, 2016. "Higher costs appeal to voters: implications of expressive voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 37-45, April.
    4. Matsusaka, John G., 2004. "For the Many or the Few," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226510811, April.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Why We Can't Have Nice Things: Bootleggers, Baptists, and Ballots
      by Eric Boehm in Hit & Run blog on 2023-08-24 17:00:47

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    Cited by:

    1. Luke Petach, 2024. "The timber wars: the endangered species act, the northwest forest plan, and the political economy of timber management in the Pacific northwest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(1), pages 209-226, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bootleggers and Baptists; Coalitions; Alcohol; Dry counties;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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