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Direct Democracy and Political Equality in the American States

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  • Patrick Flavin

Abstract

type="main"> This study investigates the relationship between direct democracy and the equality of opinion-policy representation in the American states. Using public opinion measures from the National Annenberg Election Surveys and data on state policy outputs, I generate an index of the equality of political representation (based on citizens’ incomes) that is comparable across the states. I then evaluate the relationship between different measures of direct democracy and political equality. States with the ballot initiative process are no more politically equal than states without the process. However, among those that have the ballot initiative process, states where it is easier to place a measure on the ballot for popular vote and states where the ballot initiative is more frequently used tend to weigh citizens’ opinions more equally in the policy-making process. These findings suggest that having and frequently using direct democracy leads to more egalitarian policy outcomes. More generally, this study underscores the importance of laws and institutional design in promoting political equality in the United States.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Flavin, 2015. "Direct Democracy and Political Equality in the American States," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(1), pages 119-132, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:96:y:2015:i:1:p:119-132
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ssqu.12106
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jessee, Stephen A., 2009. "Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(1), pages 59-81, February.
    2. Hall, Richard L. & Wayman, Frank W., 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 797-820, September.
    3. Matsusaka, John G., 2004. "For the Many or the Few," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226510811, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jarron Bowman, 2020. "Do the Affluent Override Average Americans? Measuring Policy Disagreement and Unequal Influence," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(3), pages 1018-1037, May.

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