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Constitutional political economy: Ulysses and the prophet Jonah

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  • Arye L. Hillman

    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

The story of Ulysses and the sirens has been used to portray the theme of the field of constitutional political economy. Indeed, Ulysses adorns the cover of the field’s journal. I compare Ulysses and the prophet Jonah as constitutional allegories. The behavior of Ulysses does not transfigure to a constitution consistent with public-choice premises, while the behavior of Jonah does. A constitution transfigured from Ulysses provides privileged personal benefits for an autocratic ruler at the expense of social costs that historically often have entailed much more than placing wax in sailors’ ears. A constitution transfigured from Jonah requires leaders and politicians to exit government when the social cost from them staying on exceeds whatever social benefits their continuation in office may provide.

Suggested Citation

  • Arye L. Hillman, 2021. "Constitutional political economy: Ulysses and the prophet Jonah," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 1-6, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:186:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00865-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00865-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buchanan, James M., 1994. "Lagged implementation as an element in constitutional strategy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 11-26, May.
    2. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    3. Buchanan, James M., 1994. "Erratum to: Lagged implementation as an element in constitutional strategy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 619-619, October.
    4. Arye Hillman, 2009. "Hobbes and the prophet Samuel on leviathan government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 1-4, October.
    5. Hillman,Arye L., 2019. "Public Finance and Public Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107136311, September.
    6. Hobbes, Thomas, 1651. "Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number hobbes1651a.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitution; Political restraint; Athens versus Jerusalem; Ethics in governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B11 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Preclassical (Ancient, Medieval, Mercantilist, Physiocratic)
    • B32 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Obituaries

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