Presidential unilateral action: partisan influence and presidential power

Focusing on executive orders (EOs) and extending previous models, we present a general theoretical framework of unilateral presidential action. This framework allows us to examine systematically how various possible party roles, such as agenda setting, result in legislative gridlock which, in turn, create or undercut presidential incentives, and how directional constraints on discretion undermine presidential leverage. In particular, negative agenda setting and party discipline intensify gridlock, enhancing presidential policy gains; positive agenda setting’s effect depends upon governmental regime. Empirically, majority parties consistently play some role, especially negative agenda setting, regardless of the threshold used to define EO significance, while party discipline is more pronounced with higher thresholds. Also, while a majority party median is crucial for constraining the direction of how presidents use discretion with lower thresholds, a chamber median (whose preference may be induced by party pressure) is key with higher thresholds.