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Presidential unilateral action: partisan influence and presidential power

Author

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  • Fang-Yi Chiou

    (Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica)

  • Lawrence S. Rothenberg

    (University of Rochester)

Abstract

Focusing on executive orders (EOs) and extending previous models, we present a general theoretical framework of unilateral presidential action. This framework allows us to examine systematically how various possible party roles, such as agenda setting, result in legislative gridlock which, in turn, create or undercut presidential incentives, and how directional constraints on discretion undermine presidential leverage. In particular, negative agenda setting and party discipline intensify gridlock, enhancing presidential policy gains; positive agenda setting’s effect depends upon governmental regime. Empirically, majority parties consistently play some role, especially negative agenda setting, regardless of the threshold used to define EO significance, while party discipline is more pronounced with higher thresholds. Also, while a majority party median is crucial for constraining the direction of how presidents use discretion with lower thresholds, a chamber median (whose preference may be induced by party pressure) is key with higher thresholds.

Suggested Citation

  • Fang-Yi Chiou & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2016. "Presidential unilateral action: partisan influence and presidential power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 145-171, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:167:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0335-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0335-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fang‐Yi Chiou & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2003. "When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(3), pages 503-522, July.
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    4. Fang‐Yi Chiou & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2014. "The Elusive Search for Presidential Power," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(3), pages 653-668, July.
    5. Kriner, Douglas L. & Reeves, Andrew, 2012. "The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 348-366, May.
    6. Patterson, Samuel C. & Caldeira, Gregory A., 1988. "Party Voting in the United States Congress," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 111-131, January.
    7. Berry, Christopher R. & Burden, Barry C. & Howell, William G., 2010. "The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 783-799, November.
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