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Why State Constitutions Differ in their Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage

Author

Listed:
  • Lupia, Arthur
  • Krupnikov, Yanna
  • Levine, Adam Seth
  • Piston, Spencer
  • Hagen-Jamae, Alexander von

Abstract

Some states treat a same-sex marriage as legally equal to a marriage between a man and a woman. Other states prohibit legal recognition of same-sex marriages in their constitutions. In every state that has a constitutional restriction against same-sex marriage, the amendment was passed by a popular vote. The conventional wisdom about allowing voter participation in such decisions is that they yield constitutional outcomes that reflect attitude differences across states. We reexamine the attitude-amendment relationship and find it to be weaker than expected. In particular, we show that states vary in the costs they impose on constituencies that desire constitutional change. Some states impose very low costs (i.e., a simple majority of voters is sufficient for change). Other states impose very high costs (i.e., substantial legislative and voter supermajoriries are requires). We find that variations in the legal status of same-sex marriage across US states is better explained by these variations in costs than they are by differences in public opinion. Our method yields an improved explanation of why states differ in their constitutional treatment of same-sex marriage today. Our findings have distinct implications for people who wish to understand and/or change the future status of same-sex couples in state constitutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Lupia, Arthur & Krupnikov, Yanna & Levine, Adam Seth & Piston, Spencer & Hagen-Jamae, Alexander von, 2009. "Why State Constitutions Differ in their Treatment of Same-Sex Marriage," MPRA Paper 15096, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15096
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lax, Jeffrey R. & Phillips, Justin H., 2009. "Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 367-386, August.
    2. John G. Matsusaka, 2005. "Direct Democracy Works," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 185-206, Spring.
    3. Matsusaka, John G., 2004. "For the Many or the Few," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226510811, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Same-sex marriage and democracy
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-05-26 17:18:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Kauder Björn & Potrafke Niklas, 2019. "Conservative Politicians and Voting on Same-sex Marriage," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 20(4), pages 600-617, December.
    2. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2009. "Direkte Demokratie und Menschenrechte," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2009 2009-27, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    3. John Matsusaka, 2014. "Disentangling the direct and indirect effects of the initiative process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 345-366, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    constitutions; same-sex marriage; political institutions; state politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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