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Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited

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  • Dan Felsenthal
  • Nicolaus Tideman

Abstract

A strong Condorcet winner (SCW) is an alternative, x, that a majority of voters rank higher than z, for every other alternative, z. A weak Condorcet winner (WCW) is an alternative, y, that no majority of voters rank below any other alternative, z, but is not a SCW. There has been some confusion in the voting/social choice literature as to whether particular voting rules that are SCW-consistent are also WCW-consistent. The purpose of this paper is to revisit this issue, clear up the confusion that has developed, and determine whether three additional SCW-consistent voting rules—that as far as we know have not been investigated to date regarding their possible WCW consistency—are indeed WCW-consistent. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Felsenthal & Nicolaus Tideman, 2014. "Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 313-326, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:160:y:2014:i:3:p:313-326
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-014-0180-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Salvatore Barbaro, 2024. "Electoral Methods and Political Polarization," Working Papers 2411, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    2. Diss, Mostapha & Dougherty, Keith & Heckelman, Jac C., 2023. "When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 128-136.
    3. Federico Fioravanti & Iyad Rahwan & Fernando Tohmé, 2022. "Properties of Aggregation Operators Relevant for Ethical Decision Making in Artificial Intelligence," Working Papers 177, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    4. Federico Fioravanti & Iyad Rahwan & Fernando Abel Tohm'e, 2022. "Classes of Aggregation Rules for Ethical Decision Making in Automated Systems," Papers 2206.05160, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Condorcet winner; Voting methods; Voting rules; Weak Condorcet winner; D71; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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