IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/mateco/v29y1998i3p271-283.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser

Author

Listed:
  • Gehrlein, William V.
  • Lepelley, Dominique

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1998. "The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 271-283, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:29:y:1998:i:3:p:271-283
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-4068(97)00020-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1981. "Constant scoring rules for choosing one among many alternatives," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 203-210, April.
    2. Tataru, Maria & Merlin, Vincent, 1997. "On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 81-90, August.
    3. Gehrlein, William V. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 38-49, October.
    4. Lepelley, Dominique, 1993. "On the probability of electing the Condorcet," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 105-116, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique & Moyouwou, Issofa, 2016. "A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 115-122.
    2. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2011. "Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 151-162, August.
    3. Erik Friese & William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Achill Schürmann, 2017. "The impact of dependence among voters’ preferences with partial indifference," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(6), pages 2793-2812, November.
    4. Hans Peters & Souvik Roy & Ton Storcken, 2012. "On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 399-429, July.
    5. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
    6. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
    7. Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting," Working Papers hal-03614585, HAL.
    8. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
    9. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2019. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Working Papers hal-02147735, HAL.
    10. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 299-320, October.
    11. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
    12. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2015. "The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 243-269, March.
    13. Hammer, P.L. & Kogan, A. & Lejeune, M.A., 2006. "Modeling country risk ratings using partial orders," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 175(2), pages 836-859, December.
    14. Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 169-205, July.
    15. Eric Kamwa, 2018. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Working Papers hal-01786590, HAL.
    16. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 519-541, June.
    17. Dan Felsenthal & Nicolaus Tideman, 2014. "Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 313-326, September.
    18. Eric Kamwa, 2018. "On the Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser," Working Papers hal-01786121, HAL.
    19. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors de l'élection présidentielle française du 22 avril 2007," Post-Print halshs-00337290, HAL.
    20. Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim, 2007. "Expérimentation du vote par note et du vote par approbation lors de l'élection présidentielle française du 22 avril 2007," Working Papers halshs-00337290, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Williams Gehrlein, 1993. "Condorcet efficiency of two stage constant scoring rules," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 95-101, February.
    2. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 519-541, June.
    3. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2019. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Working Papers hal-02147735, HAL.
    4. Eric Kamwa, 2018. "On the Likelihood of the Borda Effect: The Overall Probabilities for General Weighted Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Rules," Working Papers hal-01786590, HAL.
    5. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
    6. Eric Kamwa & Fabrice Valognes, 2017. "Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(3), pages 375-395.
    7. Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
    8. Merlin, V. & Tataru, M. & Valognes, F., 2000. "On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 183-207, March.
    9. Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique & Moyouwou, Issofa, 2016. "A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 115-122.
    10. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 299-320, October.
    11. Eric Kamwa, 2018. "On the Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser," Working Papers hal-01786121, HAL.
    12. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
    13. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/10286 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice, 2004. "The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 343-361, November.
    15. Dominique Lepelley & Fabrice Valognes, 1999. "On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 109-123, March.
    16. Hervé Crès, 2000. "Aggregation of Coarse Preferences," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01064879, HAL.
    17. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
    18. D. Marc Kilgour & Jean-Charles Grégoire & Angèle M. Foley, 2022. "Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 365-391, February.
    19. Harrison-Trainor, Matthew, 2022. "An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 68-84.
    20. Dominique Lepelley & William Gehrlein, 1999. "A Note on the Probability of Having a Strong Condorcet Winner," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 85-96, February.
    21. Hervé Crès, 2001. "Aggregation of coarse preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 507-525.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:29:y:1998:i:3:p:271-283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.