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Monetary stabilisation policy in a monetary union: some simple analytics

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  • Andrew Brigden
  • Charles Nolan

Abstract

This paper does two things. First it looks at some simple models of monetary decision-making in a monetary union and asks how much more variable a country's output and inflation is likely to be if it joins the union. The question is asnwered analytically, and the simple model is then calibrated. The model has few structual equations, but does allow an analysis of the relationship between output and inflation variability and certain key parameters. Any conclusions, in this respect, are likely to be sensitive to model specification. However, the paper goes on to identify a second-best issue concerning the optimal make-up of the union which is likely to be more robust: namely that only when all members of the union have the same structural parameter values, and shocks are perfectly correlated, will it be optimal for a new member to have these same structural parameter values.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Brigden & Charles Nolan, 1999. "Monetary stabilisation policy in a monetary union: some simple analytics," Bank of England working papers 102, Bank of England.
  • Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:102
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    1. Wörgötter, Andreas & Brixiova, Zuzana, 2020. "Monetary Unions of Small Currencies and a Dominating Member: What Policies Work Best for Benefiting from the CMA?," IZA Policy Papers 163, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2006. "Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union Under Alternative Labour-Market Structures," Working Papers of BETA 2006-25, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    3. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2001. "The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0128, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    4. Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte, 2013. "Fear of a two-speed monetary union: what does a basic correlation scatter plot tell us?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 289-299.
    5. Ferreira-Lopes, Alexandra, 2010. "In or out? The welfare costs of EMU membership," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 585-594, March.
    6. Buiter, Willem, 2000. "Optimal Currency Areas: Why Does The Exchange Rate Regime Matter?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. W.H. Buiter, 2000. "Optimal Currency Areas: Why Does the Exchange Rate Regime Matter? (With an Application to UK Membership in EMU)," CEP Discussion Papers dp0462, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    8. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Government Leadership and Central Bank Design," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0208, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Dec 2004.
    9. Matsen, Egil & Roisland, Oistein, 2005. "Interest rate decisions in an asymmetric monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 365-384, June.
    10. Kobayashi, Teruyoshi, 2005. "A model of monetary unification under asymmetric information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15.
    11. Buiter, Willem, 2000. "Monetary Misconceptions: New and Old Paradigmata and Other Sad Tales," CEPR Discussion Papers 2365, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. De Grauwe, Paul & Senegas, Marc-Alexandre, 2006. "Monetary policy design and transmission asymmetry in EMU: Does uncertainty matter?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 787-808, December.
    13. Severine Menguy, 2010. "Enlargement of the Economic and Monetary Union: To which Structurally Heterogeneous Countries?," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 53-70.

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