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How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?

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  • Cox, Gary W.
  • Magar, Eric

Abstract

A key premise of partisan theories of congressional organization is that majority status confers substantial procedural advantages. In this article, we take advantage of changes in party control of the House and Senate, such as that following the Republicans' historic victory in the midterm elections of 1994, to assess the value of majority status in terms of contributions from access-seeking political action committees (PACs). We estimate that majority status in the House was worth about $36,000 per member in receipts from corporate and trade PACs circa 1994—even controlling for the usual factors cited in the literature as affecting members' ability to raise money (such as committee assignments and voting record). The value of majority status in the Senate is even larger in absolute terms, although smaller in proportion to the total amount of money raised. Our results show that majority status is a valuable asset, one worth considerable collective effort to attain.

Suggested Citation

  • Cox, Gary W. & Magar, Eric, 1999. "How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(2), pages 299-309, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:93:y:1999:i:02:p:299-309_21
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    Cited by:

    1. Bonica Adam, 2016. "Avenues of influence: on the political expenditures of corporations and their directors and executives," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(4), pages 367-394, December.
    2. Patrick Balles & Ulrich Matter & Alois Stutzer, 2024. "Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(662), pages 2290-2320.
    3. Franklin Mixon & Chena Crocker & H. Black, 2007. "Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 503-503, March.
    4. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 2005. "Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 41-71, April.
    5. Michael Ensley, 2009. "Individual campaign contributions and candidate ideology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 221-238, January.
    6. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Yue Pan, 2015. "Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2120-2140, July.
    7. Tim Groeling & Matthew A. Baum, 2009. "Journalists’ Incentives and Media Coverage of Elite Foreign Policy Evaluations," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(5), pages 437-470, November.
    8. Alexander Fink, 2017. "Donations to Political Parties: Investing Corporations and Consuming Individuals?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 220-255, May.
    9. Lever Guzmán Carlos, 2010. "Strategic Spending in Voting Competitions with Social Networks," Working Papers 2010-16, Banco de México.
    10. Feng, Xin & Jiao, Qian & Kuang, Zhonghong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2024. "Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    11. Glenn Parker & Matthew Dabros, 2012. "Last-period problems in legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 789-806, June.

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