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Inter-municipal vs. Inter-governmental Cooperation: Their Impact on International Aid

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  • Julio C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez

    (Technical University of Munich
    Indiana University Bloomington)

  • Claudia N. Avellaneda

    (Indiana University Bloomington)

Abstract

This study combines the type of partners and the number of partnerships’ purposes to assess municipal partnerships’ effectiveness in bringing international aid. First, the study test whether inter-municipal cooperation (homogenous partners) is more effective than inter-governmental cooperation (heterogeneous partners) in increasing international aid at the local level. Second, the study tests whether partnerships with the sole purpose of raising international aid (single purpose) are more effective than partnerships with additional purposes (multiple purposes). Using panel data with 2,431 municipal-year observations, results confirm that inter-governmental partnerships with multiple purposes are the most effective partnership to increase international aid.

Suggested Citation

  • Julio C. Zambrano-Gutiérrez & Claudia N. Avellaneda, 2023. "Inter-municipal vs. Inter-governmental Cooperation: Their Impact on International Aid," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 861-881, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:23:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s11115-022-00676-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11115-022-00676-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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