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Rule growth and government effectiveness: why it takes the capacity to learn and coordinate to constrain rule growth

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  • Christian Adam

    (LMU Munich)

  • Christoph Knill

    (LMU Munich)

  • Xavier Fernandez-i-Marín

    (LMU Munich)

Abstract

This paper asks whether strong bureaucracies can effectively constrain the continuously growing stock of rules in modern democracies through organizational coordination and learning. To answer this question, the paper analyzes the growth of rule stocks in the areas of environmental policy and social policy in 23 OECD countries over the period between 1976 and 2005. To do so, it develops a new measure of rule growth based on the content of laws and regulations rather than their length. The analysis highlights that effective bureaucracies are indeed better able to contain rule growth in these areas than weak bureaucracies. Since rules have to be implemented, countries suffering from bureaucratic capacity and quality constraints thus appear to be stuck in an implementation deficit trap. Appropriate implementation is not only inherently more challenging for countries with weak public administrations, but the body of rules to be implemented also tends to grow quicker in these countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Adam & Christoph Knill & Xavier Fernandez-i-Marín, 2017. "Rule growth and government effectiveness: why it takes the capacity to learn and coordinate to constrain rule growth," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 50(2), pages 241-268, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:policy:v:50:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11077-016-9265-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s11077-016-9265-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Adam & Yves Steinebach & Christoph Knill, 2018. "Neglected challenges to evidence-based policy-making: the problem of policy accumulation," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 51(3), pages 269-290, September.
    2. Christoph Knill & Yves Steinebach, 2022. "Crises as driver of policy accumulation: Regulatory change and ratcheting in German asylum policies between 1975 and 2019," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(2), pages 603-617, April.
    3. Morelli, Massimo & Bellodi, Luca & Vannoni, Matia, 2021. "The Costs of Populism for the Bureaucracy and Government Performance:," CEPR Discussion Papers 15929, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Luca Bellodi & Massimo Morelli & Matia Vannoni, 2021. "The Costs of Populism for the Bureaucracy and Government Performance: Evidence from Italian Municipalities," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21158, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    5. Luca Bellodi & Massimo Morelli & Matia Vannoni, 2021. "The Costs of Populism for the Bureaucracy and Government Performance: Evidence from Italian Municipalities," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21158, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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