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Michele Fratianni’s Professional Career and Contributions to Economic Analysis

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  • Paolo Savona

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  • Paolo Savona, 2006. "Michele Fratianni’s Professional Career and Contributions to Economic Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 365-371, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:17:y:2006:i:4:p:365-371
    DOI: 10.1007/s11079-006-0354-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521443159 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J, 1997. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 378-393, April.
    3. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521023450 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Michele Fratianni & Theo Peeters (ed.), 1978. "One Money for Europe," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-04308-8, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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