Can political monetary cycles be avoided?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Ali al-Nowaihi & Paul Levine, "undated". "Can Political Monetary Cycles be Avoided?," Discussion Papers in European Economics 97/4, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1997.
"Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
- Lars E.O. Svensson, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," NBER Working Papers 5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Svensson, L.E.O., 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," Papers 595, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997.
"Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1111-1146, June.
- Lars E. O. Svensson, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," NBER Working Papers 5797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Svensson, Lars E.O., 1997. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," Seminar Papers 615, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Svensson, L-E-O, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting : Implementaing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," Papers 615, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Lars E O Svensson, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," Bank of England working papers 56, Bank of England.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," CEPR Discussion Papers 1511, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini, 1992.
"Political Cycles in OECD Economies,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 663-688.
- Alesina, Alberto F & Roubini, Nouriel, 1990. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Roubini, Nouriel & Alesina, Alberto, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Scholarly Articles 4553025, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini, 1990. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," NBER Working Papers 3478, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J, 1997.
"Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 378-393, April.
- Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jürgen & Waller, Christopher, 1993. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mervyn A. King, 1996. "How should central banks reduce inflation? - Conceptual issues," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 81(Q IV), pages 25-52.
- Currie, David & Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph, 1996. "The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies: Monetary Regime Options for Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 345-358, March.
- Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
- Herrendorf, Berthold & Lockwood, Ben, 1997.
"Rogoff's "Conservative" Central Banker Restored,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 476-495, November.
- Herrendorf, Berthold & Lockwood, Ben, 1996. "Rogoff's Conservative Central Banker Restored," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 450, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Herrendorf, Berthold & Lockwood, Ben, 1996. "Rogoff'S 'Conservative' Central Banker Restored," Economic Research Papers 268699, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Herrendorf, Berthold & Lockwood, Ben, 1996. "Rogoff's 'Conservative' Central Banker Restored," CEPR Discussion Papers 1386, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Al-Nowaihi, A & Levine, Paul L, 1996. "Independent but Accountable: Walsh Contracts and the Credibility Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 1387, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988.
"Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
- Rogoff, Kenneth & Sibert, Anne, 1985. "Elections And Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," SSRI Workshop Series 292676, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute.
- Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1986. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
- Mervyn A. King, 1996. "How should central banks reduce inflation? conceptual issues," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 53-91.
- Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990.
"Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995.
"The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence,"
Papers
9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
- McCallum, Bennett T, 1995.
"Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-211, May.
- Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
- Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994.
"How independent should a central bank be?,"
Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 195-225.
- Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 2006. "Political shocks and public debt: The case for a conservative central bank revisited," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1857-1883, November.
- Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Post-Print hal-01291401, HAL.
- Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
- Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, March.
- Ali al-Nowaihi & Dean Garratt, 1998. "The New Political Macroeconomics," Discussion Papers in Economics 98/05, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
- Ali al-Nowaihi & Paul Levine & Alex Mandilaras, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and the `Free Lunch Puzzle': A New Perspective," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0806, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
- Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999.
"Political economics and macroeconomic policy,"
Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482,
Elsevier.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Working Papers 121, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Papers 630, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," NBER Working Papers 6329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini , Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Seminar Papers 630, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Weymark, Diana N., 2007. "Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 297-315, February.
- Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 2001.
"Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matter?,"
Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 371-392.
- Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2000. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matters?," MPRA Paper 18693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred J.M. Neumann, 2003.
"The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 43-64, January.
- Herrendorf, Berthold & Neumann, Manfred J.M., 1998. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015.
"Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics,"
Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2015. "Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1503, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- M. Lossani & P. Natale, & P. Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers 9707, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-448, July.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2010.
"A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 647-677, June.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2010. "A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 647-677, June.
- Mr. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Mr. Eric Le Borgne, 2003. "A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence," IMF Working Papers 2003/144, International Monetary Fund.
- Alex Cukierman & Stefan Gerlach, 2003.
"The inflation bias revisited: theory and some international evidence,"
Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(5), pages 541-565, September.
- Cukierman, Alex & Gerlach, Stefan, 2003. "The Inflation Bias Revisited: Theory and Some International Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 3761, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred Neumann, 2000.
"A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence,"
Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 136(2), pages 315-333, June.
- Herrendorf, Berthold & Neumann, Manfred J. M., 1998. "A Non-normative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence," Economic Research Papers 268797, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Herrendorf, B. & Neumann, M.J.M., 1998. "A non-Normative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 515, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003.
"Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 271-295, September.
- Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2002. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Working papers 2002-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, March.
- Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 87-117, March.
- Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers 06, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 1997.
- J. De Haan & F. Amtenbrink & S.C.W. Eijffinger, 1999.
"Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification,"
BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 52(209), pages 169-193.
- J. De Haan & F. Amtenbrink & S.C.W. Eijffinger, 1999. "Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 52(209), pages 169-193.
- de Haan, J. & Amtenbrink, F. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1998. "Accountability of Central Banks : Aspects and Quantification," Other publications TiSEM 51661f17-9a86-4fde-9ab5-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- de Haan, J. & Amtenbrink, F. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1998. "Accountability of Central Banks : Aspects and Quantification," Discussion Paper 1998-54, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Siklos, Pierre L., 2008. "No single definition of central bank independence is right for all countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 802-816, December.
- Muscatelli, V Anton, 1998.
"Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences, and Central Bank Independence,"
Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 412-430, July.
- Anton Muscatelli, 1996. "Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences and Central Bank Independence," Working Papers 9615, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Nov 1996.
- Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
- repec:bla:jecsur:v:14:y:2000:i:5:p:513-26 is not listed on IDEAS
- Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- V A Muscatelli & Patrizio Tirelli, 1995. "Institutional Change, Inflation Targets and the Stability of Interest Rate Reaction Functions in OECD Economies"," Working Papers 9606, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Apr 1996.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:42:y:1998:i:3:p:525-545. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.