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Measuring Price Behavior in New Residential Subdivisions

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  • Harris Hollans
  • Richard Martin
  • Henry Munneke

Abstract

Early buyers of single-family residences in newly developed subdivisions assume a greater level of risk than later buyers in choosing to purchase a home in a new subdivision where the market has not been sufficiently established. This risk stems from such things as uncertainty regarding the maintenance of development standards and other negative externalities inherent in purchasing in the early stages of the development cycle. Because of this, early buyers may require lower prices to compensate them for the additional risk that they assume. This paper explores the evolution of the price of residences in newly developed single-family subdivisions through the phases of development. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Harris Hollans & Richard Martin & Henry Munneke, 2013. "Measuring Price Behavior in New Residential Subdivisions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 227-242, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:47:y:2013:i:2:p:227-242
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-012-9364-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Henry J. Munneke & Joseph T. L. Ooi & C. F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, 2019. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Sequential Sales," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 517-543, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Housing markets; Subdivisions; Development sequence; Price structures; R31; R32;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets
    • R32 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis

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