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Real Estate Auctions: A Survey of Theory and Practice

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  • Quan, Daniel C

Abstract

Recent downturns in real estate markets combined with a general acceptance of auctions have resulted in an unprecedented number of auction sales. A need therefore exists for the further development of real estate auction models that can provide insights into this emerging market institution. To facilitate this task, a survey of auction theory as pertaining to its application in real estate markets is provided in this paper. Topics addressed include bidding equilibria, the role of reserve prices, information disclosure, the decision to use auctions, bidder participation, and multiple-object sales. An overview of empirical studies in this area is also provided. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Quan, Daniel C, 1994. "Real Estate Auctions: A Survey of Theory and Practice," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 23-49, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:9:y:1994:i:1:p:23-49
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    Cited by:

    1. Dries R. Goossens & Sander Onderstal & Jan Pijnacker & Frits C. R. Spieksma, 2014. "Solids: A Combinatorial Auction for Real Estate," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 351-363, August.
    2. Stephen Buschbom & Carolyn Dehring & Neil Dunse & Henry Munneke, 2018. "Sealed-Bid Auctions and Fixed Price Sales: Seller Choice in Housing Markets," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 525-545, May.
    3. Takako Idee & Shinichiro Iwata & Teruyuki Taguchi, 2011. "Auction Price Formation with Costly Occupants: Evidence Using Data from the Osaka District Court," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 84-98, January.
    4. Christopher Garcia, 2016. "Winner Determination Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Sub-cardinality Constraints," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 47(3), pages 401-421, March.
    5. von Hobe, Cord-Friedrich & Musshoff, Oliver, 2021. "On the effectiveness of restricted tendering as a form of policy intervention on agricultural land markets," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    6. Lozano-Gracia, Nancy & Young, Cheryl & Lall, Somik V. & Vishwanath, Tara, 2013. "Leveraging land to enable urban transformation : lessons from global experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6312, The World Bank.
    7. Vangerven, Bart & Goossens, Dries R. & Spieksma, Frits C.R., 2017. "Winner determination in geometrical combinatorial auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 258(1), pages 254-263.
    8. Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2016. "“Buy-It-Now” or “Sell-It-Now” auctions: Effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 27-30.
    9. Carl R. Gwin & Seow-Eng Ong & Andrew C. Spieler, 2005. "Auctions and Land Values: An Experimental Analysis," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 42(12), pages 2245-2259, November.
    10. Di Corato, Luca & Moretto, Michele, 2016. "Selling real assets: the impact of idiosyncratic project risk in an auction environment," Working Paper Series 2016:9, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department Economics.
    11. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2015. "Learning and market clearing: theory and experiments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 203-241, October.
    12. Maurice Tse & Frederik Pretorius & K. Chau, 2011. "Market Sentiments, Winner’s Curse and Bidding Outcome in Land Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 247-274, April.
    13. Sumit Agarwal & Jing Li & Ernie Teo & Alan Cheong, 2018. "Strategic Sequential Bidding for Government Land Auction Sales – Evidence from Singapore," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 535-565, November.
    14. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2022. "Do traders learn to select efficient market institutions?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 203-228, February.
    15. Crescenzio Gallo & Giancarlo De Stasio & Cristina Di Letizia, 2006. "A Data Set Generation Algorithm in Combinatorial Auctions," Quaderni DSEMS 01-2006, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    16. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2020. "Do Traders Learn to Select Efficient Market Institutions?," ECON - Working Papers 364, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    17. Takako Idee & Shinichiro Iwata & Teruyuki Taguchi, 2008. "Auction Price Formation with Costly Occupants: Evidence Using Data from the Osaka District Court," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-593, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    18. Jarl G. Kallberg & Crocker H. Liu & Adam Nowak, 2021. "An Empirical Analysis of Double Round Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(2), pages 531-555, June.
    19. Onur A. Koska & Ilke Onur & Frank Stähler, 2017. "The Economics of Vendor Bids," ERC Working Papers 1711, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2017.
    20. Han, Lu & Strange, William C., 2015. "The Microstructure of Housing Markets," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 813-886, Elsevier.
    21. Zan Yang & Rongrong Ren & Hongyu Liu & Huan Zhang, 2015. "Land leasing and local government behaviour in China: Evidence from Beijing," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 52(5), pages 841-856, April.
    22. Yuen Leng Chow & Joseph T.L. Ooi, 2014. "First-Price Sealed-Bid Tender versus English Open Auction: Evidence from Land Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 253-278, June.
    23. Maggie Rong Hu & Adrian D. Lee, 2020. "Outshine to Outbid: Weather-Induced Sentiment and the Housing Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1440-1472, March.
    24. Fuerst, Franz & Gabrieli, Tommaso & McAllister, Patrick, 2017. "A green winner's curse? Investor behavior in the market for eco-certified office buildings," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 137-146.
    25. Jianfu Shen & Frederik Pretorius & K. W. Chau, 2018. "Land Auctions with Budget Constraints," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 443-471, April.

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