Uniformity Requirement and Political Accountability
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DOI: 10.1007/s00712-006-0209-3
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European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 385-397, September.
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- Jean, HINDRIKS & Ben, Lockwood, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation and Vote Welfare," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Mar 2005.
- Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Hindriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," Economic Research Papers 269623, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Lockwood, Ben & Hindricks, Jean, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 5125, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- José Ángel Alcántara-Lizárraga & Alexandra Jima-González, 2022. "Accountability, Corruption, and Opposition Groups: Evidence from Latin America," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 11(12), pages 1-14, November.
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More about this item
Keywords
voting theory; electoral accountability; centralization; uniformity; D72; H11; H70;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
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