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Voting for mobile citizens

Author

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  • Matthias Wrede

    (Philipps-University Marburg)

Abstract

This paper analyzes inter- and intraregional redistribution in a centralized state using the citizen-candidate model. It focuses on conflicting interests among regions and among citizens of varying mobility. If discrimination with respect to place of residence and degree of mobility is possible, diversity of interests is high. Under the plurality rule and with sincere voting, the largest socioeconomic group of citizens supplies the winning candidate and discriminates against all other groups. However, if discrimination with respect to the degree of mobility is constrained, mobile citizens may gain power and interregional redistribution is reduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Wrede, 2008. "Voting for mobile citizens," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200817, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:200817
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    File URL: https://www.uni-marburg.de/en/fb02/research-groups/economics/macroeconomics/research/magks-joint-discussion-papers-in-economics/papers/2008-papers/17-2008_wrede.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hindriks, Jean, 1999. "The consequences of labour mobility for redistribution: tax vs. transfer competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 215-234, November.
    2. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    3. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    4. Matthias Wrede, 2006. "Uniformity Requirement and Political Accountability," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 95-113, November.
    5. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
    6. Shankar, Raja & Shah, Anwar, 2003. "Bridging the Economic Divide Within Countries: A Scorecard on the Performance of Regional Policies in Reducing Regional Income Disparities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(8), pages 1421-1441, August.
    7. Wildasin, David E, 1991. "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 757-774, September.
    8. Oliver Lorz & Stanislav Nastassine, 2007. "Citizen-candidate mobility and endogenous local policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 27-47, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bogdan Vintila, 2010. "Classification Criteria for the AIOC Target Group Members," Knowledge Horizons - Economics, Faculty of Finance, Banking and Accountancy Bucharest,"Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University Bucharest, vol. 2(2), pages 62-71, June.
    2. Tsuchimoto Menkyna, Fusako, 2014. "A theory of ethnic diversity and income distribution: A legislative bargaining approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 52-67.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting; mobility; inter- and intraregional redistribution; discrimination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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