IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/itaxpf/v18y2011i2p193-213.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Targeting public services through the unequal treatment of unequals

Author

Listed:
  • Audun Langørgen

Abstract

When private goods are publicly provided, government authorities have to determine the distribution of services on recipients. In this paper, the public service provider is assumed to maximize utility defined over service supply to different target groups, given a budget constraint. The production technology is target group specific and depends on the ability of each target group to produce service outcomes. Three benchmark allocation principles are identified: equality of treatment (ET), equality of outcome (EO) and equality of marginal cost (EMC). These principles can be considered to be consistent with special cases of a public preference model, which allows for compromises between different allocation principles. The condition of technological dominance implies that there is a clear-cut equity-productivity trade-off, whereas violations of this condition may reduce the significance of the trade-off.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Audun Langørgen, 2011. "Targeting public services through the unequal treatment of unequals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(2), pages 193-213, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:18:y:2011:i:2:p:193-213
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-010-9152-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-010-9152-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10797-010-9152-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tobin, James, 1970. "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 263-277, October.
    2. Aaberge, Rolf & Langorgen, Audun, 2003. "Fiscal and Spending Behavior of Local Governments: Identification of Price Effects When Prices Are Not Observed," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 125-161, October.
    3. Kelman, Steven, 1986. "A Case for In-Kind Transfers," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 55-73, April.
    4. John E. Roemer & Alain Trannoy, 2013. "Equality of Opportunity," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1921, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Indraneel Dasgupta & Ravi Kanbur, 2005. "Community and anti-poverty targeting," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 3(3), pages 281-302, December.
    6. Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-377, May.
    7. Spiros Bougheas & Indraneel Dasgupta & Oliver Morrissey, 2007. "Tough love or unconditional charity?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 561-582, October.
    8. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1971. "A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of Equality in Public Expenditures," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 85(3), pages 409-415.
    9. van de Walle, Dominique, 1998. "Targeting Revisited," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 13(2), pages 231-248, August.
    10. Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2008. "Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 333-383, June.
    11. Behrman, Jere R & Craig, Steven G, 1987. "The Distribution of Public Services: An Exploration of Local Governmental Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 37-49, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Liao, Bin & Li, Lin & Tian, Cai Hong, 2024. "How does the pilot policies of new urbanization improve uneven development?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 86-103.
    2. Audun Langørgen, 2015. "A structural approach for analyzing fiscal equalization," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(3), pages 376-400, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Khera, Reetika, 2014. "Cash vs. in-kind transfers: Indian data meets theory," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 116-128.
    2. Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2008. "Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 333-383, June.
    3. Gasparini, Leonardo C. & Pinto, Santiago M., 2006. "Equality of opportunity and optimal cash and in-kind policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 143-169, January.
    4. Lopez-Rodriguez, David, 2011. "The Political Economy of In-Kind Redistribution," MPRA Paper 44152, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2012.
    5. Ariel Fiszbein & Norbert Schady & Francisco H.G. Ferreira & Margaret Grosh & Niall Keleher & Pedro Olinto & Emmanuel Skoufias, 2009. "Conditional Cash Transfers : Reducing Present and Future Poverty," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2597.
    6. Lehmann, M. Christian & Matarazzo, Hellen, 2019. "Voters’ response to in-kind transfers: Quasi-experimental evidence from prescription drug cost-sharing in Brazil," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    7. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2014. "Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 375-408, June.
    8. Federica VIGANO & Andrea SALUSTRI, 2015. "Matching profit and Non-profit Needs: How NPOs and Cooperative Contribute to Growth in Time of Crisis. A Quantitative Approach," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(1), pages 157-178, March.
    9. Eriksen, Michael D. & Lang, Bree J., 2020. "Overview and proposed reforms of the low-income housing tax credit program," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    10. James M. Poterba, 1996. "Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health Care: How and Why?," NBER Chapters, in: Individual and Social Responsibility: Child Care, Education, Medical Care, and Long-Term Care in America, pages 277-308, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. König, Tobias & Lausen, Tobias, 2016. "Relative consumption preferences and public provision of private goods," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2016-213, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    12. Audun Langørgen, 2000. "Revealed Standards for Distributing Public Home-Care on Clients," Discussion Papers 288, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    13. John Leach, 2010. "Ex Post Welfare under Alternative Health Care Systems," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(6), pages 1027-1057, December.
    14. Ajwad, Mohamed Ihsan & Wodon, Quentin, 2007. "Do local Governments maximize access rates to public services across areas?: A test based on marginal benefit incidence analysis," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 242-260, May.
    15. Pamela Campa & Lucija Muehlenbachs, 2024. "Addressing Environmental Justice through In-Kind Court Settlements," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 415-446, February.
    16. Fleurbaey, Marc & Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Maguain, Denis, 2002. "Education, distributive justice, and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 113-150, April.
    17. Rema Hanna & Benjamin A Olken & Elan Satriawan & Sudarno Sumarto & Abhijit Banerjee, "undated". "Pangan versus Kupon Makanan: Bukti dari Eksperimen Berskala Besar di Indonesia," Working Papers 3537, Publications Department.
    18. World Bank Group, 2016. "Cash Transfers in Humanitarian Contexts," World Bank Publications - Reports 24699, The World Bank Group.
    19. Jesse M Cunha & Giacomo De Giorgi & Seema Jayachandran, 2019. "The Price Effects of Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 240-281.
    20. Zhuan Pei, 2017. "Eligibility Recertification and Dynamic Opt-In Incentives in Income-Tested Social Programs: Evidence from Medicaid/CHIP," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 241-276, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Treatment targeting; Technological dominance; Equity–productivity trade-off; Publicly provided private goods; In-kind transfers; Ability types; H42;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:18:y:2011:i:2:p:193-213. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.