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Scientific policy and free riders

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  • Oscar Alfranca

Abstract

This paper presents econometric evidence of the effects of knowledge capital and institutions on technology transfer funding. A model is proposed and fitted for 31 research units on agricultural, forestry, and food sciences in Catalonia, Spain from 1990 to 1996. We find a strong impact of knowledge capital and institutional variables on technology transfer funding. Considering administrative costs strengthens the main points of the model and in some cases greatly changes the results. In particular, we reject the hypothesis that administrative costs do not matter. We also find evidence of the existence of free-rider strategies and that increasing returns-to-scale economies exist when bidding for technology transfer funding. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2001

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  • Oscar Alfranca, 2001. "Scientific policy and free riders," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 7(1), pages 147-158, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:7:y:2001:i:1:p:147-158:10.1007/bf02296599
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02296599
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    Cited by:

    1. Wanda Pełka, 2007. "Rozwój systemu finansowego w Polsce a dostępność kapitału na innowacje," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 11-12, pages 17-34.

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