IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/geneva/v43y2018i1d10.1057_s10713-018-0024-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Welfare effects of insurance contract non-performance

Author

Listed:
  • Glenn W. Harrison

    (Georgia State University
    Georgia State University
    University of Cape Town)

  • Jia Min Ng

    (Georgia State University)

Abstract

Non-performance lies at the heart of much of the regulation that insurance companies face. Consumers’ concerns about non-performance of the insurance provider have also been cited as a possible explanation for low demand of microinsurance. We provide a behavioral evaluation of the welfare effects of non-performance risk. We test the hypothesis that the presence of non-performance risk negatively impacts not just take-up of insurance but more importantly the welfare of the insured. We also test if violations of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom could drive this decrease in take-up and welfare. The results show that the compound risk characteristic of non-performance risk does not significantly decrease the welfare of insurance choices made by individuals. This counter-intuitive result is sensitive to the structural modeling of risk preferences. If one assumes the reduction of compound lotteries axiom does characterize behavior towards risk, one finds evidence that non-performance risk reduces welfare for the insured. But if one correctly allows for violations in that axiom in the representation of risk preferences, which is appropriate if one is going to test for the effect of compound risk from non-performance, then the counter-intuitive result is obtained. Take-up is not a reliable proxy for welfare, and the behavioral drivers of take-up are again not the same drivers of welfare. These results provide structural behavioral insight to inform normative policy design with respect to insurance regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Glenn W. Harrison & Jia Min Ng, 2018. "Welfare effects of insurance contract non-performance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 43(1), pages 39-76, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:geneva:v:43:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1057_s10713-018-0024-0
    DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0024-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s10713-018-0024-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1057/s10713-018-0024-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Sugden, 2004. "The Opportunity Criterion: Consumer Sovereignty Without the Assumption of Coherent Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1014-1033, September.
    2. Cummins, J David & Mahul, Olivier, 2003. "Optimal Insurance with Divergent Beliefs about Insurer Total Default Risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 121-138, October.
    3. Levon Barseghyan & Francesca Molinari & Ted O'Donoghue & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2013. "The Nature of Risk Preferences: Evidence from Insurance Choices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2499-2529, October.
    4. Peter Klibanoff & Massimo Marinacci & Sujoy Mukerji, 2005. "A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1849-1892, November.
    5. Glenn W. Harrison & J. Todd Swarthout, 2016. "Cumulative Prospect Theory in the Laboratory: A Reconsideration," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2016-04, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. repec:bla:econom:v:65:y:1998:i:260:p:581-98 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. B. Douglas Bernheim, 2009. "Behavioral Welfare Economics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 267-319, 04-05.
    8. Daniel J. Clarke, 2016. "A Theory of Rational Demand for Index Insurance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 283-306, February.
    9. Glenn W. Harrison, 2011. "Experimental methods and the welfare evaluation of policy lotteries," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 38(3), pages 335-360, August.
    10. Segal, Uzi, 1990. "Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 349-377, March.
    11. Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant, 2012. "Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioural Data Sets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(1), pages 375-387.
    12. John David Cummins & Olivier Mahul, 2003. "Optimal insurance with divergent beliefs about total default risk," Post-Print hal-01952121, HAL.
    13. Glenn Harrison & E. Rutström, 2009. "Expected utility theory and prospect theory: one wedding and a decent funeral," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(2), pages 133-158, June.
    14. Cox, James C. & Sadiraj, Vjollca, 2006. "Small- and large-stakes risk aversion: Implications of concavity calibration for decision theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 45-60, July.
    15. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2012. "Categorize Then Choose: Boundedly Rational Choice And Welfare," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(5), pages 1141-1165, October.
    16. Harrison, Glenn W. & Martínez-Correa, Jimmy & Swarthout, J. Todd, 2015. "Reduction of compound lotteries with objective probabilities: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 32-55.
    17. Harrison, Glenn W. & Lau, Morten I. & Ross, Don & Swarthout, J. Todd, 2017. "Small stakes risk aversion in the laboratory: A reconsideration," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 24-28.
    18. Olivier Mahul & Brian Davern Wright, 2004. "Implications of incomplete performance for optimal insurance," Post-Print hal-01952109, HAL.
    19. Glenn W. Harrison & Jia Min Ng, 2016. "Evaluating The Expected Welfare Gain From Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 91-120, January.
    20. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    21. Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2007. "Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 745-788, June.
    22. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2014. "Welfare economics and bounded rationality: the case for model-based approaches," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 343-360, December.
    23. Drazen Prelec, 1998. "The Probability Weighting Function," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 497-528, May.
    24. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2009. "Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 51-104.
    25. Gollier, Christian & Schlesinger, Harris, 1996. "Arrow's Theorem on the Optimality of Deductibles: A Stochastic Dominance Approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 359-363, February.
    26. Wakker, Peter P & Thaler, Richard H & Tversky, Amos, 1997. "Probabilistic Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 7-28, October.
    27. Anja Zimmer & Helmut Gründl & Christian D. Schade & Franca Glenzer, 2018. "An Incentive†Compatible Experiment on Probabilistic Insurance and Implications for an Insurer's Solvency Level," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 85(1), pages 245-273, March.
    28. Loomes, Graham & Sugden, Robert, 1982. "Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(368), pages 805-824, December.
    29. Bohnet, Iris & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2004. "Trust, risk and betrayal," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 467-484, December.
    30. Cummins, J. David & Doherty, Neil & Lo, Anita, 2002. "Can insurers pay for the "big one"? Measuring the capacity of the insurance market to respond to catastrophic losses," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(2-3), pages 557-583, March.
    31. Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith, 1978. "An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange Institutions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(1), pages 133-153.
    32. Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, 2005. "The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 530-545, June.
    33. Mahul, Olivier & Wright, Brian D., 2007. "Optimal coverage for incompletely reliable insurance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 456-461, June.
    34. Yuval Salant & Ariel Rubinstein, 2008. "(A, f): Choice with Frames -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(4), pages 1287-1296.
    35. Neil A. Doherty & Harris Schlesinger, 1990. "Rational Insurance Purchasing: Consideration of Contract Nonperformance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(1), pages 243-253.
    36. Quiggin, John, 1982. "A theory of anticipated utility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 323-343, December.
    37. Justin Sydnor, 2010. "(Over)insuring Modest Risks," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 177-199, October.
    38. Zimmer, Anja & Schade, Christian & Gründl, Helmut, 2009. "Is default risk acceptable when purchasing insurance? Experimental evidence for different probability representations, reasons for default, and framings," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 11-23, February.
    39. Carmen Herrero & Josefa Tomás & Antonio Villar, 2006. "Decision theories and probabilistic insurance: an experimental test," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 35-52, March.
    40. Harrison, Glenn W, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1426-1443, December.
    41. Harrison, Glenn W, 1994. "Expected Utility Theory and the Experimentalists," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 223-253.
    42. Yanyan Liu & Robert J. Myers, 2016. "The Dynamics Of Microinsurance Demand In Developing Countries Under Liquidity Constraints And Insurer Default Risk," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 121-138, January.
    43. repec:bla:econom:v:71:y:2004:i:284:p:661-670 is not listed on IDEAS
    44. Jan V. Hansen & Rasmus H. Jacobsen & Morten I. Lau, 2016. "Willingness To Pay For Insurance In Denmark," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 49-76, January.
    45. Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, 1998. "Testing Different Stochastic Specificationsof Risky Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(260), pages 581-598, November.
    46. Loomes, Graham & Sugden, Robert, 1987. "Some implications of a more general form of regret theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 270-287, April.
    47. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Glenn W. Harrison & Andre Hofmeyr & Harold Kincaid & Brian Monroe & Don Ross & Mark Schneider & J. Todd Swarthout, 2022. "Subjective beliefs and economic preferences during the COVID-19 pandemic," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 795-823, June.
    2. Guilhem Lecouteux & Ivan Mitrouchev, 2021. "The "View from Manywhere": Normative Economics with Context-Dependent Preferences," GREDEG Working Papers 2021-19, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    3. Johannes G. Jaspersen & Richard Peter & Marc A. Ragin, 2023. "Probability weighting and insurance demand in a unified framework," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 48(1), pages 63-109, March.
    4. Guilhem Lecouteux & Ivan Mitrouchev, 2022. "Preference Purification in Behavioural Welfare Economics: an Impossibility Result," GREDEG Working Papers 2022-31, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    5. Hui Li & Seth Neumuller & Casey Rothschild, 2021. "Optimal annuitization with imperfect information about insolvency risk," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(1), pages 101-130, March.
    6. Glenn W. Harrison & Jia Min Ng, 2019. "Behavioral insurance and economic theory: A literature review," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(2), pages 133-182, July.
    7. Biener, Christian & Landmann, Andreas & Santana, Maria Isabel, 2019. "Contract nonperformance risk and uncertainty in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 65-83.
    8. Xiaoxue Sherry Gao & Glenn W. Harrison & Rusty Tchernis, 2023. "Behavioral welfare economics and risk preferences: a Bayesian approach," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(2), pages 273-303, April.
    9. Hong Fu & Yuehua Zhang & Yinuo An & Li Zhou & Yanling Peng & Rong Kong & Calum G. Turvey, 2022. "Subjective and objective risk perceptions and the willingness to pay for agricultural insurance: evidence from an in-the-field choice experiment in rural China," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 47(1), pages 98-121, March.
    10. Peter, Richard & Ying, Jie, 2020. "Do you trust your insurer? Ambiguity about contract nonperformance and optimal insurance demand," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 938-954.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Glenn W. Harrison & Jia Min Ng, 2019. "Behavioral insurance and economic theory: A literature review," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(2), pages 133-182, July.
    2. Glenn W. Harrison, 2019. "The behavioral welfare economics of insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(2), pages 137-175, September.
    3. Glenn W. Harrison & Jia Min Ng, 2016. "Evaluating The Expected Welfare Gain From Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(1), pages 91-120, January.
    4. Johannes G. Jaspersen & Richard Peter & Marc A. Ragin, 2023. "Probability weighting and insurance demand in a unified framework," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 48(1), pages 63-109, March.
    5. Biener, Christian & Landmann, Andreas & Santana, Maria Isabel, 2019. "Contract nonperformance risk and uncertainty in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 65-83.
    6. Peter, Richard & Ying, Jie, 2020. "Do you trust your insurer? Ambiguity about contract nonperformance and optimal insurance demand," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 938-954.
    7. Glenn W. Harrison, 2024. "Risk preferences and risk perceptions in insurance experiments: some methodological challenges," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 49(1), pages 127-161, March.
    8. Aurélien Baillon & Aleli Kraft & Owen O’Donnell & Kim Wilgenburg, 2022. "A behavioral decomposition of willingness to pay for health insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 43-87, February.
    9. Benjamin L. Collier & Daniel Schwartz & Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel‐Kerjan, 2022. "Insuring large stakes: A normative and descriptive analysis of households' flood insurance coverage," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(2), pages 273-310, June.
    10. Markus Huggenberger & Peter Albrecht, 2022. "Risk pooling and solvency regulation: A policyholder's perspective," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(4), pages 907-950, December.
    11. Heutel, Garth, 2019. "Prospect theory and energy efficiency," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 236-254.
    12. Johannes G. Jaspersen & Marc A. Ragin & Justin R. Sydnor, 2022. "Predicting insurance demand from risk attitudes," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(1), pages 63-96, March.
    13. Franz Dietrich & Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden, 2021. "Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(2), pages 143-164, April.
    14. Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2013. "Salience and Consumer Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 803-843.
    15. Mankaï, Selim & Marchand, Sébastien & Le, Ngoc Ha, 2024. "Valuing insurance against small probability risks: A meta-analysis," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    16. Andersen, Steffen & Harrison, Glenn W. & Lau, Morten Igel & Rutström, Elisabet E., 2010. "Behavioral econometrics for psychologists," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 553-576, August.
    17. Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt & Mats Köster, 2020. "Salience and Skewness Preferences [Risk-neutral Firms can Extract Unbounded Profits from Consumers with Prospect Theory Preferences]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(5), pages 2057-2107.
    18. Adrian Bruhin & Maha Manai & Luís Santos-Pinto, 2022. "Risk and rationality: The relative importance of probability weighting and choice set dependence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 65(2), pages 139-184, October.
    19. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Lehmann, Martin, 2020. "Balancing the desire for privacy against the desire to hedge risk," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 608-620.
    20. Aurélien Baillon & Owen O'Donnell & Stella Quimbo & Kim van Wilgenburg, 2022. "Do time preferences explain low health insurance take‐up?," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(4), pages 951-983, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insurance non-performance; Welfare; Behavioral economics; Risk preferences; Experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:geneva:v:43:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1057_s10713-018-0024-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.