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Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets with Compound Risk

Author

Listed:
  • Rachel J. Huang

    (National Central University)

  • Arthur Snow

    (University of Georgia)

  • Larry Y. Tzeng

    (National Taiwan University)

Abstract

Building on the model of insurance contracting with hidden knowledge of risk class introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we assume that insurance applicants fail to reduce compound lotteries. In contrast with the adverse selection equilibrium identified by Rothschild and Stiglitz, in which coverage and expected claims frequency are positively correlated, we show that an advantageous selection equilibrium is possible, with coverage and expected claims frequency being negatively correlated. Whereas previous theories explain advantageous selection by adding a hidden action or a second dimension of hidden knowledge, our analysis shows that advantageous selection can arise solely as a consequence of insurance applicants’ attitude toward bearing compound risks.

Suggested Citation

  • Rachel J. Huang & Arthur Snow & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2017. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets with Compound Risk," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(2), pages 171-192, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:geneva:v:42:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1057_s10713-017-0023-6
    DOI: 10.1057/s10713-017-0023-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Nghiem, Son & Graves, Nicholas, 2019. "Selection bias and moral hazard in the Australian private health insurance market: Evidence from the Queensland skin cancer database," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 259-265.
    2. Jing Ai & Lin Zhao & Wei Zhu, 2016. "Contracting with Present-Biased Consumers in Insurance Markets," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 41(2), pages 107-148, September.
    3. CATRINA, Ersilia, 2018. "Insurance, A Guaranteed Risk Or A Risk Assumed?," MPRA Paper 87769, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2018.
    4. Ersilia CATRINA, 2018. "Insurance, A Guaranteed Risk Or A Risk Assumed?," Junior Scientific Researcher, SC Research Publishing SRL, vol. 4(1), pages 121-133, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adverse selection; Advantageous selection; Increasing aversion to second-stage risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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