Does size and book-to-market contain intangible information about managerial incentives? Learning from corporate D&O insurance purchase
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DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2021.101560
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Cited by:
- Su, Xuan-Qi, 2023. "Directors' and Officers' liability insurance and cross section of expected stock returns: A mispricing explanation," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Size; Book-to-market; Directors' and officers' liability insurance; Advantageous selection; Intangible information; Adverse selection;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- C30 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - General
Statistics
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