Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market
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- Pau Olivella & Fred Schroyen, 2014. "Multidimensional Screening in a Monopolistic Insurance Market," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(1), pages 90-130, March.
- Pau Olivella & Fred Schroyen, 2012. "Multidimensional Screening in a Monopolistic Insurance Market," Working Papers 619, Barcelona School of Economics.
- OLIVELLA, Pau & SCHROYEN, Fred, 2011. "Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2011056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Cited by:
- Barigozzi, Francesca & Burani, Nadia, 2016. "Competition and screening with motivated health professionals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 358-371.
- Rachel J. Huang & Arthur Snow & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2017.
"Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets with Compound Risk,"
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(2), pages 171-192, September.
- Rachel J. Huang & Arthur Snow & Larry Y. Tzeng, 2017. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets with Compound Risk," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(2), pages 171-192, September.
- Buitrago, Giancarlo & Bardey, David, 2015.
"Voluntary Health Plan Subsidies and Public Expenditure,"
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212854, Universidad de Los Andes, Economics Department.
- Giancarlo Buitrago & David Bardey, 2015. "Voluntary Health Plan Subsidies and Public Expenditure," Documentos CEDE 13879, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
- Bardey, David & Buitrago, Giancarlo, 2015. "Voluntary Health Plan Subsidies and Public Expenditure," TSE Working Papers 15-605, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Chen, An & Li, Hong & Schultze, Mark, 2022. "Collective longevity swap: A novel longevity risk transfer solution and its economic pricing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 201(C), pages 227-249.
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More about this item
Keywords
insurance markets; asymmetric information; screening; gender discrimination; positive correlation test.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2011-12-19 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2011-12-19 (Insurance Economics)
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