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On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation

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  • Jana Vyrastekova
  • Daan van Soest

Abstract

We study the effectiveness of costly rewards in mitigating excess extraction in a standard Common Pool Resource (CPR) game experiment. We implement two treatments. In the first, rewards are a pure transfer from one player to the other. In the second, the benefits of receiving a reward are higher than the cost of providing it. Referring to the latter as “net positive” rewards, we observe that these are used more frequently than transfer rewards, and that, unlike transfer rewards, they are effective in sustaining cooperation in the CPR game. Copyright Economic Science Association 2008

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  • Jana Vyrastekova & Daan van Soest, 2008. "On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(1), pages 53-65, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:11:y:2008:i:1:p:53-65
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9153-x
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    3. Dickinson, David L. & Masclet, David & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2015. "Norm enforcement in social dilemmas: An experiment with police commissioners," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 74-85.
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    7. Saptarshi Pal & Christian Hilbe, 2022. "Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 13(1), pages 1-11, December.
    8. Ganga Shreedhar, Alessandro Tavoni, Carmen Marchiori, 2018. "Monitoring and punishment networks in a common-pool resource dilemma: experimental evidence," GRI Working Papers 292, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
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    10. Jan T.R. Stoop & Daan P. van Soest & Jana Vyrastekova, 2013. "A tale of two carrots: the effectiveness of multiple reward stages in a common pool resource game," Chapters, in: John A. List & Michael K. Price (ed.), Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment, chapter 10, pages 291-318, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Richter, Andries & Grasman, Johan, 2013. "The transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 202-209.
    12. van Soest, Daan & Stoop, Jan & Vyrastekova, Jana, 2016. "Toward a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 1-13.
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    14. Noussair, C.N. & van Soest, D.P., 2014. "Economic Experiments and Environmental Policy : A Review," Discussion Paper 2014-001, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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