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Heterogeneous Impacts in Voluntary Agreements: A Changes-in-Changes Approach to the UK Climate Change Agreements

Author

Listed:
  • Kentaro Florian Mayr

    (University College London Energy)

  • Paolo Agnolucci

    (University College London Institute for Sustainable Resources
    World Bank)

Abstract

The limited microeconometric evidence on the efficacy of environmental Negotiated Agreements (NAs) is an obstacle to both their introduction and effective design. We help fill this gap by providing evidence on the impact of the second Climate Change Agreements (CCAs) on business electricity consumption and employment. The CCAs are NAs offering a reduction on the Climate Change Levy (CCL), an energy consumption tax, in exchange for commitments to improve energy efficiency. We use the novel changes-in-changes method to account for heterogeneity in treatment effects. Our results indicate that the second CCAs yielded improved outcomes compared to the counterfactual of full CCL with an average reduction of − 4.81% in electricity consumption. They also reveal the importance of allowing for heterogeneity, as the impact on electricity consumption at the identified deciles varied between − 9.33 and 12.54%. This is a marked difference from the first CCAs which were found to increase consumption. The heterogeneity in treatment response is corroborated when extending the study to two large industrial sectors in the sample and when studying firms selecting differing target reporting methods. Confirming the findings from earlier studies of the first scheme, our results indicate a non-statistically significant reduction in employment, about − 4.6% on average, for the second CCAs.

Suggested Citation

  • Kentaro Florian Mayr & Paolo Agnolucci, 2023. "Heterogeneous Impacts in Voluntary Agreements: A Changes-in-Changes Approach to the UK Climate Change Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 86(3), pages 345-379, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:86:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10640-023-00797-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-023-00797-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Wen & Hao, Xinyu & Zhang, Xiaoling, 2024. "Climate policy interactions: Capturing game signals in carbon markets," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voluntary agreements; Environmental tax; Environmental subsidies; Energy; Changes-in-changes; Climate Change Agreements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q40 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - General
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis

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