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Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements

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  • Pierre Courtois
  • Guillaume Haeringer

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  • Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer, 2012. "Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 565-584, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:151:y:2012:i:3:p:565-584
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9759-6
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    1. Hans-Peter Weikard & Leo Wangler & Andreas Freytag, 2015. "Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 711-727, December.
    2. Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Jesús & Rapoport, Hillel, 2014. "Tradable immigration quotas," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 94-108.
    3. Köke, Sonja & Lange, Andreas, 2017. "Negotiating environmental agreements under ratification constraints," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 90-106.
    4. Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2020. "Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 555-582, June.
    5. Pierre Courtois & Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdaït, 2024. "Revolutions and rational choice: A critical discussion [Révolutions et choix rationnel : une analyse critique]," Post-Print hal-04566834, HAL.
    6. Martin Kesternich, 2016. "Minimum participation rules in international environmental agreements: empirical evidence from a survey among delegates in international climate negotiations," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(12), pages 1047-1065, March.
    7. Pierre Courtois & Rabia Nessah & Tarik Tazdaït, 2024. "Revolutions and rational choice: A critical discussion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 497-529, September.
    8. Kai Lessmann & Robert Marschinski & Michael Finus & Ulrike Kornek & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2014. "Emissions Trading with Non-signatories in a Climate Agreement—an Analysis of Coalition Stability," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82, pages 82-109, December.

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