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Fiscal and monetary interactions when wage-setters are large: is there a role for corporatist policies?

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  • Lilia Cavallari

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  • Lilia Cavallari, 2010. "Fiscal and monetary interactions when wage-setters are large: is there a role for corporatist policies?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 291-309, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:37:y:2010:i:3:p:291-309
    DOI: 10.1007/s10663-009-9109-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1522-1542, December.
    2. Holden, Steinar, 2005. "Monetary regimes and the co-ordination of wage setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 833-843, May.
    3. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1997. "The Welfare State and Competitiveness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 921-939, December.
    5. Lawrence Summers & Jonathan Gruber & Rodrigo Vergara, 1993. "Taxation and the Structure of Labor Markets: The Case of Corporatism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(2), pages 385-411.
    6. Cukierman, Alex & Dalmazzo, Alberto, 2007. "Fiscal Policy, Labour Unions and Monetary Institutions: Their Long Run Impact on Unemployment, Inflation and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 6429, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Tito Boeri & Michael C. Burda, 2009. "Preferences for Collective Versus Individualised Wage Setting," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1440-1463, October.
    8. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Robert E. Cumby & Behzad T. Diba, 2002. "Should the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve be concerned about fiscal policy?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 333-389.
    9. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, 1987. "Monopolistic Competition and the Effects of Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 647-666, September.
    10. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2007. "Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 56-63, January.
    11. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2007. "Is Corporatism Feasible?," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 340-359, May.
    12. Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(367), pages 576-595, September.
    13. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Bartolomeo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2007. "Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in the EMU," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 281-289, July.
    14. Beetsma,R. & Favero,C. & Missale,A. & Muscatelli,V. A. & Natale,P. & Tirelli,P. (ed.), 2004. "Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policies and Labour Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521823081, September.
    15. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jesús Ferreiro & Carmen Gómez, 2014. "Implementing a Voluntary Wage Policy: Lessons from the Irish and Spanish Wages Policies before the Crisis," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 61(1), pages 107-127, Februar.
    2. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2014. "Optimal Degree of Union Centralization," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 2(2), pages 201-211, December.
    3. Cavallari, Lilia, 2012. "Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 160-163.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy games; Monetary and fiscal policy interactions; Wage bargaining; Trade unions; Social pact; Corporatism; E52; E61; E63; J51;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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