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Punitive attitudes toward cartels: evidence from an experimental study

Author

Listed:
  • Béatrice Boulu-Reshef

    (Université d’Orléans)

  • Constance Monnier

    (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

This paper investigates the determinants of punitive attitude toward cartels and documents the factors underlying the support for harsher sanctions against these anticompetitive practices. The responses are collected in an experimental design in which participants are exposed to various levels of cartel-type agreement costs. This experimental manipulation allows us to highlight the fact that individuals are more punitive when they are victims of cartels that reduce their earnings. In addition, punitiveness increases in the number of cartels experienced. Overall, punitive attitudes toward cartels are influenced by socio-demographic variables such as age and education level. Being a man is also associated with higher punitiveness. Last, the perceived seriousness of cartels and cartel awareness, are associated with higher punitive attitudes.

Suggested Citation

  • Béatrice Boulu-Reshef & Constance Monnier, 2024. "Punitive attitudes toward cartels: evidence from an experimental study," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 481-516, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:58:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10657-024-09824-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-024-09824-w
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; Cartel; Fraud; Moral behavior; Sanctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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