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After the sunset: the residual effect of temporary legislation

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  • Frank Fagan

Abstract

The difference between permanent legislation and temporary legislation is the default rule of termination: permanent legislation governs perpetually, while temporary legislation governs for a limited time. Recent literature on legislative timing rules considers the effect of temporary legislation to stop at the moment of expiration. When the law expires, so does its regulatory effect. This article extends that literature by examining the effect of temporary legislation beyond its expiration. We show that in addition to affecting compliance behavior which depends on statutory enforcement, temporary legislation also affects compliance behavior which does not depend on statutory enforcement, and more generally, organizational behavior after a sunset. When temporary legislation expires therefore, it can continue to administer regulatory and other effects. We specify the conditions for this process and give the optimal legislative response. Copyright The Author(s) 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Fagan, 2013. "After the sunset: the residual effect of temporary legislation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 209-226, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:36:y:2013:i:1:p:209-226
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9219-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Urmee Khan & Frank Fagan, 2018. "Optimal Legal Moments and Stabilization Rules," Working Papers 201807, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Timing rules; Temporary legislation; Sunset clauses; Statutory obsolescence; K23; K42;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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