Transparency and accountability of central banks in their role of financial stability supervisor in OECD countries
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-006-0400-6
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Oosterloo, Sander & de Haan, Jakob & Jong-A-Pin, Richard, 2007. "Financial stability reviews: A first empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 337-355, March.
- David Howarth & Aneta Spendzharova, 2019. "Accountability in Post‐Crisis Eurozone Governance: The Tricky Case of the European Stability Mechanism," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 894-911, July.
- Tatiana Gaelle Yongoua Tchikanda, 2017. "Systemic risk and individual risk: A trade-off?," Working Papers hal-04141656, HAL.
- Tatiana Gaelle Yongoua Tchikanda, 2017. "Systemic risk and individual risk: A trade-off?," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-16, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Bogdan Capraru, 2010. "Financial Stability And Central Bank Transparency In Europe," Analele Stiintifice ale Universitatii "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" din Iasi - Stiinte Economice (1954-2015), Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 57, pages 95-108, november.
- Louise Parsons, 2013. "Developments in central banking after the GFC: central banks, the state, globalisation and the GFC," Chapters, in: John Farrar & David G. Mayes (ed.), Globalisation, the Global Financial Crisis and the State, chapter 10, pages 218-242, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Athanassiou, Phoebus, 2011. "Financial sector supervisors' accountability: a european perspective," Legal Working Paper Series 12, European Central Bank.
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Keywords
Financial stability; Accountability;Statistics
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