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Opportunities for Reform

In: Defense Economics

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  • Marcus Matthias Keupp

    (Military Academy)

Abstract

In principle, any economic system can be reformed in two ways: by changing the existing inventory of institutions or by replacing this inventory with an alternative one (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Buchanan 1990). A military organization can try to implement reforms within the planned economy system, or it can abandon this system and adopt an alternative instead. However, reforms within a planned economy system are possible only to a limited extent.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcus Matthias Keupp, 2021. "Opportunities for Reform," Springer Books, in: Defense Economics, chapter 0, pages 115-134, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-73815-0_5
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-73815-0_5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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