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Austritt erlaubt? Die Verfassung der Europäischen Union braucht ein Sezessionsrecht

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  • Doering Detmar

Abstract

The topic of „secession“ is usually associated with violence and political disorder. There are, however, more positive aspects to be found in it. Secession may also be seen as a defence against centralistic and discriminatory legislation. Especially in the case of the European Union the right of secession may be discussed in a meaningful way, because the immanent centralising tendencies of the EU could be countered effectively this way. Otherwise the EU with its cultural, social and economic diversity could be likely to turn its policies into an illiberal and anti-free market direction in the long run. Secession as such does not necessarily counter such policies successfully. What is needed is a proper theory of secession with some practical applications. It should be based on rules that strengthen individual choice and democracy. In existing federations/ confederations like the EU it is possible and desirable to define the right of secession as a constitutional right. Secession, then, can be carried out peacefully under the rule of law. A constitutional right would also enable the „lower“ tiers of government to exercise pressure against discriminatory legislation. These advantages can be enhanced by concrete rules. These rules should concern federal property, the time horizon of secession, the public debt and the democratic criteria for secession (such as qualified majorities). Also it has to be settled whether unilateral or bilateral secession should be allowed. In the case of the EU unilateralism seems to recommendable, because otherwise the EU would be the last instance in the decision making process. The inclusion of a right of secession in a European constitution will strengthen the principle of subsidiarity and the right of „last resort“ of the member states. Another important outcome would be a type of competitive federalism in which free markets could flourish.

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  • Doering Detmar, 2000. "Austritt erlaubt? Die Verfassung der Europäischen Union braucht ein Sezessionsrecht," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 51(1), pages 383-404, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:51:y:2000:i:1:p:383-404:n:17
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2000-0117
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    1. Lars Feld, 2005. "The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 417-448, March.

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